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ABSTRACT*
A model of a voluntary “green” payment program is developed to control nitrate leaching and runoff 
from com production in New York. The program achieves environmental goals through self-interested 
choices of farmers, grouped by the productive and environmental characteristics of soils. It considers 
randomness in prices, production, and environmental damage. Farmers are assumed to maximize expected 
utility subject to chance constraints on severe levels of nitrate contamination.
This program compensates farmers for applying environmentally safe levels of nitrogen fertilizer. If 
information is symmetric, program participation conditions require that the post-policy expected utility is at 
least as large as pre-policy expected utility. Under asymmetric information payments must be set so that 
farmers in group i always prefer their own policy over group’s policy. If information is symmetric, the two 
groups have separate optimal policies. If information is asymmetric, separate policies are optimal if, and only 
if, the group with higher marginal productivity of nitrogen can meet environmental standards more easily; 
otherwise only a single policy need be specified.
An empirical application of the model to three New York farming regions is based on estimated yield 
and environmental damage relationships from New York soils data. Asymmetric information between 
producers and the government would impose a cost burden on society. Separate policies are specified for the 
two groups, and the cost of information is as high as $11 per acre. The group most susceptible to nitrate 
leaching and runoff receives a windfall benefit, but this group makes up only about 10% of the total com  
acreage.
Two alternative methods of defining environmental quality standards are examined. First, 
environmental standards impose relative (percentage) reductions from pre-policy levels of nitrate loss. The 
second method requires an absolute level of environmental quality.
The optimal payments range from $1 to $28 per acre. Under relative standards, payments are highest 
in the region with the highest level of pre-policy environmental quality. This situation is reversed when 
absolute standards are imposed. At an aggregate level, the program payments would range from $0.5 million 
to $3.5 million over the regions combined, representing between 3% and 18% of total government payments 
received by farmers in the three regions in 1992.
The effect of risk aversion on program payments depends on whether nitrogen fertilizer is a risk 
increasing or risk reducing input. For the New York case studied, nitrogen was a risk reducing input for the 
group with higher yielding soils, and a risk increasing input for the other. Higher levels of risk aversion 
increase payments for the first group and decrease payments for the second.
The authors are former Graduate Research Assistant, and Professor, respectively, Department of 
Agricultural, Resource and Managerial Economics, Cornell University. Funding for this project was provided by 
ERS, USDA, Cooperative Agreement 43-3AEM-2-80090 and Agricultural Experiment Station Hatch Project NYC- 
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INTRODUCTION
Increasing public awareness and concern for the quality of our nation's surface 
and groundwater supplies have, in recent years, elevated the interest in policies to 
control environmental damage at all levels of government. Point sources of water 
contamination, such as industrial dumping of wastes, or the leaching of chemicals from 
waste disposal sites, are often easy to identify, and traditional policies such as taxes and 
quantity restrictions can prove effective in dealing with such cases. Here, the process of 
administration and enforcement can be relatively straightforward as well.
Less is known about the extent to which non-point sources of contamination 
exacerbate the nation's water quality problems. National studies (Nielson and Lee, 
1987; Kellog et al., 1992) suggest that non-point agricultural sources do contribute to 
ground and surface water problems (particularly in the Midwest, in the southeast 
coastal plains and in the irrigated farming areas of the West), but even in those regions, 
the seriousness of the problem depends on soils, production practices, and the 
proximity of agricultural land to important surface and groundwater sources. There 
remains substantial disagreement as to the how widespread these problems are and the 
overall extent of the agricultural industry's effect of water quality. These disagreements 
are unlikely to be completely resolved in the near future.
The formulation of sound policies to regulate environmental damage from 
agricultural production has proved to be difficult as well. Recent advances in complex 
biophysical transport models have improved our ability to predict the movement of 
residues, but these vary significantly for soils with different physical properties and 
productivity, and alternative management practices. What is not known is the extent 
and geographic distribution of these circumstances and conditions across major regions 
of the country, within specific production areas, or across farms. The data requirements 
for such investigations are substantial.
Policy analysts are beginning to recognize the importance of this spatial diversity 
in policy formulation. Helfand and House (1996), for example, conclude, "[t]he possible 
cost of using uniform instruments in nonuniform conditions could be quite high; on the 
other hand, the cost of using nonuniform instruments, in terms of monitoring and 
enforcement costs, could also be quite high" (p.1016). Thus, if we are to select from the 
list of conventional policy tools, such as taxes or quantity restrictions on inputs or 
pollution, substantial inefficiencies or high administrative costs are apparently
2inevitable. A major cause for the problems, costs, and inefficiencies in policy 
implementation is the asymmetry of information between policy makers on the one 
hand, and the farmers on the other. Since farmers know much more about their land 
and other resource situations than do even the local policy makers or program 
administrators, the challenge is to design creative policies which recognize this fact to 
accomplish stated environmental policy goals at minimum social cost.
One recent proposal is an incentive-based voluntary "green" payment program 
under asymmetric information (Wu and Babcock, 1995). This policy was originally 
formulated for two groups of producers, but was also examined at a theoretical level for 
an arbitrary number of groups (Wu and Babcock, 1996). This type of program would 
offer "green" payments to farmers as an incentive to adopt environmentally sound 
production practices. Separate policies for different groups of farmers would be 
determined based on their resource situations, and payment levels would be set so that 
farmers have no incentive to choose a policy intended for another group. These 
features of the program allow policies to diverge across groups, with a limited 
administrative burden.
Wu and Babcock formulate their policy to maximize social welfare, which is 
equal to farm income less the social cost of pollution and the marginal social cost of 
raising tax revenue to support government payments. The analysis assumes that net 
returns and environmental damage are known with certainty; it was also necessary to 
set the unknown social costs of pollution at arbitrary levels so that tax rates needed to 
raise sufficient revenue could be determined. Chambers and Quiggin (1996) analyze a 
similar policy which incorporates production risk: in a principal-agent setting, the 
government formulates a crop insurance mechanism so that risk averse farmers have 
less of an incentive to apply fertilizer.
Objectives
This research extends the analysis of "green" payment schemes in several 
important ways. First, the optimal design of the program is determined both under 
symmetric and asymmetric information. Second, the self-selection conditions for 
setting program payments, which insure that producers have no incentive to select the 
wrong option, take account explicitly of price risk and yield risk due to weather. 
Finally, following Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988) and Zhu et al. (1994), the
3government's policy objectives are articulated as a chance constraint which limits the 
probability of severe environmental damage.
Empirically, this policy alternative is applied to control nitrate leaching and 
runoff from corn production in three major production regions of New York. To 
facilitate the policy analysis, cropland is grouped primarily on the basis of corn 
productivity and the soil's potential for nitrate leaching and runoff. Although the 
emphasis is on a policy where "green" payments are offered as an incentive to reduce 
nitrogen fertilizer application, the policy design could be modified in obvious ways to 
examine optimal "green" payments to achieve voluntary adoption of other 
environmentally sound production practices.
By characterizing policies under both symmetric and asymmetric information, 
the analysis isolates conditions under which it is necessary to articulate different 
policies for each group and when a single policy is sufficient. Estimated payments for 
the two situations provide the basis for determining the additional government cost 
due to the asymmetric information about the resource endowments of farm groups.
The explicit inclusion of production and price risk is particularly timely, given 
the likelihood that agricultural production will become riskier as traditional farm 
programs are de-emphasized. Through this analysis, the effect of risk on the optimal 
size of program "green" payments can be studied. It is also be possible to identify the 
implications for the effectiveness of programs that are implemented under erroneous 
assumptions about the risk attitudes of farmers.
Regulating environmental quality through chance constraints accommodates the 
inherent uncertainty in environmental damage, and is consistent with a standards 
approach to environmental regulation as discussed by Baumol and Oates (1988) and as 
practiced by many agencies. Through this standards approach, many of the problems 
inherent in assigning social values to environmental damage are avoided.1
techniques for valuing the environment have been developed (e.g. Randall, 1987), and they 
have been implemented empirically (e.g. Jordan and Elnagheeb, 1993; Poe and Bishop, 1992; 
Sun et al,, 1992; Edwards, 1988; Malone and Barrows, 1990; and Boyle et al., 1994), but most of 
this work is for small areas. It has proved extremely difficult to generalize these results to 
larger regions.
4Organization of the Report
The remainder of this report proceeds with the development of a theoretical 
model of production under uncertainty, which determines farmers' tradeoffs between 
input reduction and compensation payments. These tradeoffs, along with chance 
constraints on environmental damage, are incorporated in a mechanism design model 
of a voluntary "green" payment program, which allows the optimal policies under 
different situations to be characterized. The third section contains a description of data 
and procedures used to estimate the corn yield and nitrate leaching and runoff 
functions of the policy design model. A stylized version of the empirical model is used 
to highlight the results. The description of three New York study regions in section 4 
is followed by a presentation of the empirical results of the model's application to these 
three regions. The final section provides some conclusions and policy implications.
THEORETICAL MODEL
In a "green" payment program to control nitrate leaching and runoff from corn 
production, farmers voluntarily adopt an environmentally sound production practice in 
exchange for compensation payments from the government. The hypothesis 
underlying such a policy scheme is that different groups of producers have distinct 
production and pollution characteristics, implying that optimal environmental policies 
should also differ across groups. In the case of nitrate contamination, production and 
pollution characteristics differ by soil.
A "green" payment scheme would not just formulate distinct policies for each 
producer group, but would also achieve distinct policy outcomes when participation in 
the program is voluntary. To implement such a program, the government would 
present a "m enu" of policies, and allow each producer to choose his or her own policy 
from all the menu items. Here, a policy refers to a particular production practice and the 
associated government compensation payment, and the government's problem is one of 
properly designing and pricing the choices on the policy menu. For each group, the 
government determines production practices which ensure that environmental policy 
goals are met, and also sets compensation payments so that a farmer will voluntarily 
select, from all the choices on the menu, the policy designed for his or her own group.
The model is viewed from the perspective of a government planner who must 
first collect information about the production and pollution characteristics of different 
groups of producers and then select production practices and compensation payments
5for each group. Environmental policy goals must be met, while limiting the cost of the 
program to taxpayers. To build a model with enough detail for the proper policies to 
actually be determined, the meaning of "producer groups", "production practices", 
"information", "environmental policy goals", and "compensation payments" must be 
made precise.
The Producer Groups
A basic assumption of the program under consideration is that producers can be 
separated into mutually exclusive groups on the basis of some characteristic that affects 
both pollution and production levels. In the case of nitrate leaching and runoff, soil 
type, which influences both the amount of nitrate leaching and crop yield, is a logical 
candidate. For simplicity, and realistically for administrative reasons, only two groups 
of producers are considered. In principle, of course, such a program could 
accommodate an arbitrary number of producer groups, and the model developed here 
can be extended to consider the more general case (e.g., Wu and Babcock, 1996).
Production Practices and Information
To reduce nitrate pollution, the program may require such production practices 
as more frequent and timely applications of fertilizer during the growing season, 
planting corn in narrower rows, eliminating winter manure spreading, or limiting the 
amount of nitrogen fertilizer applied. This study explores reductions in nitrogen 
fertilizer. Thus to implement this "green" payment program, the government must 
identify for the two groups: (1) the association between nitrogen application rates and 
pollution levels, and (2) the cost of adopting this "practice" (the opportunity cost, or 
foregone farm income associated with sub-optimal fertilization levels).
In many cases, the government may have no more information than the 
characteristics of a typical group member. If the government does know the group 
identity of each producer, we say that information is symmetric; the government is able 
to offer each farmer a policy menu with two items: "do not participate (and receive no 
payment)", or "adopt the production practice designed for your group and accept the 
associated payment". The other possibility is that information is asymmetric; the 
government either has insufficient information to determine which farmers belong to 
which group or avoids using this classification as an overt basis for setting program 
payments (Chambers, 1992). Under asymmetric information, the government must
6offer the same policy menu to all producers, and this menu would necessarily include 
policies designed for every group.
In the case of nitrate leaching and runoff, one might suppose that the 
government does or could collect sufficient information to classify farmers into groups 
on the basis of soil type or productivity. Nevertheless, ignoring this information in 
formulating a voluntary policy would avoid substantial administrative costs. Under 
asymmetric information the producers themselves would decide which policy to 
implement, rather than having government officials decide for them. Since the 
government would be able to implement the program under either symmetric or 
asymmetric information, the ultimate choice of the better "information regime" will 
hinge upon the policy outcomes from the two cases, and in particular, the relative sizes 
of compensation payments. Thus, it is important to characterize the optimal policies for 
both cases.
Environmental Quality Standards
Since the program has an environmentally-based policy goal, the policy design 
model must include a criterion to determine by how much nitrogen fertilizer should be 
reduced for each group of farmers to abate nitrate loss by some specified amount. The 
first-best criterion in this circumstance is to abate pollution until the marginal social cost 
of the last unit abated equals the marginal social benefits from improved environmental 
quality, but in the case of nitrate contamination, a first-best solution is impractical 
(Helfand and House, 1996). Even though the on-farm cost of reducing nitrogen 
fertilizer may be known, and nitrate losses can be approximated with biophysical 
simulation models, the association between nitrate losses and contamination levels in 
drinking water supplies is not known. Thus, under current procedures, marginal social 
cost and marginal social benefits simply cannot be linked to agricultural production 
practices.
A more appropriate and realistic criterion in this case is the standards approach 
to environmental regulation, as proposed by Baumol and Oates (1988). With this 
approach, the model incorporates pollution abatement as a constraint rather than as an 
objective; the planner implementing the program uses scientific judgment to select some 
level of abatement as an "environmental standard", and then determines policies 
necessary to achieve the standard. Since the socially optimal level of abatement is
7unknown, the next best alternative is to ensure that any given level of pollution 
abatement is achieved at least cost.
To implement the "green" payment policy, the government must determine the 
fertilization rates for which nitrate loss will satisfy environmental quality standards. 
The amount of nitrate loss generated by group i is L1 = lt(Nt,W ,C :) where N, is per-acre 
fertilizer application for a producer in group i, W is a (random) vector of weather 
variables common to both groups, and Q  is a vector of soil characteristics for group i. 
Nitrate loss is a random variable because of its dependence on W, which implies that 
environmental quality standards must be defined over uncertain levels of 
environmental damage. As Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988) have shown, an efficient 
regulatory device in this instance is a chance constraint which restricts the probability 
that harmful levels of environmental damage will occur. Applying chance constraints 
to the case of leaching and runoff, the fertilization level N, (1=1,2) will satisfy the 
environmental quality standard specified by (L‘,a) if
(1) Pr[/,(N,.,W ,C,)>L*]<a
where L* is some critical level of leaching, and a  is some small probability.
Tradeoffs Between Compensation Payments and Nitrogen Fertilizer
If farmers limit nitrogen application below unregulated pre-policy levels, they 
forego farm income. Thus, the compensation payments required for voluntary 
participation in the program depend on the relationship between nitrogen fertilizer 
applied and income. The model developed here incorporates the inherent uncertainty 
in crop production. If a farmer participates in the program, any payment he receives 
from the government is certain income, but the income earned from crop production is 
random. To derive farmers' tradeoffs between these two competing sources of income, 
farmers are assumed to derive utility from income, and make their decisions to 
maximize the expected level of utility (Mas-Collel et al., 1995).
Let the net returns per acre for group i be defined as:
(2) Ri{Ni,W ,r /P) = w i(Ni/W )-r N i - V / z=l,2,
where p is the price of corn silage, y‘ is the per-acre production function for group i 
(assumed to be twice differentiable and strictly concave), N, is nitrogen fertilizer 
application per acre for group z, W is a vector of weather variables in the region, r is the 
price of nitrogen fertilizer, and V is (constant) non-nitrogen variable cost. The variables
8W, p, and r are random, implying that net returns for both groups are also random 
variables.
Farmers in both groups are assumed to be risk averse, valuing net returns 
according to the increasing and strictly concave utility functions w,. These preferences 
are defined on empirical distributions of net returns, based on historical observations of 
weather and (real) prices over T crop years. Used in this way, these historical 
observations do not describe the production process over time, but rather represent a 
random sample of T observations from the underlying distributions of weather and 
prices. That is, farmers' beliefs about the probability distributions of weather and prices 
are based on historical experiences. This nonparametric approach to defining a 
probability distribution is analytically more tractable than using a probability density 
function and circumvents the problem of finding the correct parametric distribution in 
applications (Collender and Chalfant, 1986).
In the empirical distributions, each observation Rlt corresponds to net returns if 
the weather and price conditions in year t were realized (f=l,2,...,T):
where Wt is the vector of weather variables observed in year t, pt and rt are year t 
realizations of corn and nitrogen fertilizer prices, respectively, and other variables are 
as previously defined. Let S, represent per-acre government payments to producers in 
group i, and define the function:
to be mean utility for group i, based on the empirical distributions of prices and 
weather over years t= l,...,T . The following proposition gives the relevant properties of 
this function (proof in Appendix A).
Proposition ! :  The function ufN^S^ possesses the following properties:
By property (b) and the expected utility hypothesis, the farmers' pre-policy 
decision problems can be written:
(4)
(5) max u'(N:,0)N;> 0 '
9where S; has been set to zero reflecting no government payments. Property (a) 
guarantees that solutions to these problems exist and are unique. Accordingly, let Nfl 
represent the optimal pre-policy level of nitrogen fertilizer for group i.
The Policy Design Problem
Here, the government's policy design problem is presented for both the 
symmetric and asymmetric information case, and sufficient conditions are derived to 
guarantee the existence of solutions. Suppose, first, that information between 
producers and the government is symmetric. In this case, the government can identify 
to which group each producer belongs; policies for the two groups {(Si ,Ni ),(S2,N2)} must 
be chosen so that the nitrogen levels Ni and N2 will meet environmental quality 
standards, and the compensation payments Si and S2 so that farmers in both groups are 
willing to participate. Formally, the government's problem is:
where A, is the number of acres of corn in each group, N," is the maximum level of N, 
that meets the environmental quality standard in expression (1), and all other variables 
are as previously defined.
The government's objective is to minimize the total cost of the program. 
Constraints (E,) ensure that on all land in corn, the probability of environmental 
damage exceeding U is no more than a. Constraints (P,) guarantee that producers in 
both groups are willing to participate in the program; post-policy expected utility for 
group i producers is at least the pre-policy level.
Consider now the case where information is asymmetric. The critical difference 
in this case is that the government does not know the group identity of any individual 
producer. Thus, both policies would be available to producers in both groups, and 
further restrictions must be imposed on problem (6) so that farmers will voluntarily 
choose the policy designed for their own group. These incentive compatibility constraints 
require that:
(6) min A S , +A 7S7(S, ,S2,N!,N2] 11 z z
subject to: Nt < N ' , i = 1,2, (E f)
(Pi)
(P2)
w1(N1,S1) > u 1(N1°, 0), 
u2(N2,S2)> u 2(N2°, 0 ),
Ni> 0, Si > 0, t=l,2,
10
( h )
m2(N2/S2) > m2(N1/S1) / (Iz)
and ensure that producers in each group have no incentive to select the policy designed 
for the other group. Group z's post-policy expected utility is at least as great under its 
own policy option as it would be under group j's policy option.
To guarantee that a solution to this new problem exists, the functions u l must 
satisfy the "single-crossing property" (Mas-Collel et ah, 1995). In words, this condition 
requires that one of the groups must always need more compensation for the same 
reduction in nitrogen fertilizer. Intuitively, to meet self-selection conditions under 
asymmetric information, the groups' tradeoffs between N  and S must differ. Without 
loss of generality, this property can be expressed:
_  u%(N,S) u1n(N,S)
(7)
dS
dN us(N ,S)
>
dS
I n
M N ,S )e % +,
where u‘N and uls are the first-order partial derivatives of u ' with respect to N  and S. 
Geometrically, this property requires that the two groups' iso-expected-utility curves, 
passing through any common point in (N,S) space, cross exactly once. This condition is 
depicted in Figure 1, where the level set of the function u2 is steeper than that of u1. 
Expanding the derivatives of u‘ from its definition in equation (4), this condition 
written in terms of producers' net return functions is:
(8)
T~X l u ^ R f i N )  + S) • Rtfj(N) T- 1 Z u{(R}(N) + S) • r}n (N)
t=1 ^ t=1>
7 - 1 I^(/??(A 0 + S)
t=1
T - 'Z u iiR jm  + S)
t=1
where R'tN is the first-order partial derivative of Rh with respect to N. After canceling 
T-vs and cross-multiplying terms, condition (8) becomes:
(9) + S)u’2(R2,(N ) + S)IR2m (N) -  R!n(N)] > 0 ,
( = 1 S=1
which requires that in all possible pairs of years, "on average", the marginal value 
product of group 2 must be larger than for group 1, when the difference is weighted by 
the product of marginal utilities at the respective net returns.
11
Figure 1. The Single-Crossing Property.
The following proposition relates this condition to the yield functions y1 (proof in 
Appendix A).
Proposition 2: I f
By2(N,W ) By\N,W)
BN
>
BN
-for all (N,W), the single crossing property
will be satisfied.
Intuitively, if group 2's marginal product of nitrogen is higher at every fertilization 
level and for all weather conditions, the average of marginal returns across years of 
observed weather will also be higher.
Optimal Policy Design
Having established the existence of solutions to the policy design problem, we 
proceed with an analysis to understand the nature of the optimal policy design. This 
design depends in large measure on the relationships between land productivity and 
initial fertilization levels for the two groups. In reality, these relationships are an 
empirical question, but to proceed with the analysis, we must assume that some initial 
conditions hold. Throughout, we also highlight the implications for policy design when 
the conditions are otherwise.
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Condition 1:
dy2(N,W ) 
dN >
dy\N ,W ) 
dN for all (N,W).
Condition 2: N°2 > N°.
C ondition 3: 0 < N* < min{N °,N 2}.
By Proposition 2, the first condition is sufficient for the single crossing property to hold 
and therefore guarantees that the policy design problem has a solution. The second 
condition is motivated by the first, but does not, in general, follow directly from it.* 2 
This assumption is made only for simplicity in argument; it is sufficient but not 
necessary for the results that follow. The third condition implies that producers in both 
groups must decrease fertilizer application from initial levels to meet environmental 
quality standards and that the standards can be met with a strictly positive level of 
nitrogen application; these assumptions merely rule out uninteresting cases.
The foregoing conditions specify how the production characteristics of the two 
groups relate to one another, but no corresponding conditions restrict environmental 
damage for the two groups. Since we do not know a priori which of the two groups 
causes more severe environmental damage, two cases must be considered in 
determining optimal policies: (1) N2 <N\, and (2) N[ < N In the first case, producers 
in group 1 may apply more nitrogen than group 2 to meet the same environmental 
quality standard, implying that if both groups apply nitrogen at the same rate, group 2 
soils would generate more nitrate leaching and runoff. (Recall also from Condition 1 
that corn yield on group 2 soils is more responsive to changes in nitrogen fertilizer.) 
The second case reflects the opposite circumstance: group 1 producers must apply less 
nitrogen fertilizer than producers in group 2 to meet the same environmental quality 
standard; for the same nitrogen application, group 1 soils generate a higher level of 
nitrate leaching and runoff. The following propositions describe the optimal policies in 
both cases.
Proposition 3: Suppose that information is symmetric and Condition 3 holds. Then, 
whether N2 < N[ or N[ <N'2, the constraints (Ei) and (PJ will bind in the optimal policies for  
i=l,2.
2 For example, if nitrogen has a larger risk reducing effect for group 1 than for group 2, risk 
averse group 1 producers may use more nitrogen than would otherwise be the case. If this 
effect is strong enough, the optimal fertilization rate may be higher for group 1 than for group
2, even though group 2's marginal value product of nitrogen is higher.
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PROOF: Since the objective function is strictly increasing in Si, the constraints (Pi) 
must hold with equality: ufN ^S^ = u'(N°,0). Since Ms(N;/S ,)>  0 , the foregoing
equality implicitly defines the functions S,(N,) such that:
ui(Ni,Si(Ni)) = u i(N% 0), 
with derivatives:
(10) S'(Nt) = -
u^N ^SfN ,))
W siN M N ,))
< 0 ,
where the foregoing inequality follows because ) > 0 ,  and u^(N; /S, ) > 0 for all
Nj e [0,N*] c  [0,N,°]. Substituting the functions Si(Ni) in the objective function for Si, 
the problem becomes:
min A1S1(N1) +A 2S2(N2) .
N,e[0,N']
By (10) and the fact that A, > 0, the objective function is decreasing in Nu Therefore, the 
optimal policies will be set at their upper limits, Ni\ establishing that constraints (Ei) 
hold with equality.
The policy outcomes under symmetric information are shown in Figures 2(a) and 
2(b) for the cases N'2 < N[ and N[<N*2, respectively. In either case, fertilization levels 
are set exactly at the maximum amounts that satisfy environmental standards, and 
producers in both groups are indifferent between participating in the program and 
having no program at all.
Proposition 4: Suppose that information is asymmetric and that Conditions 1, 2, and 3 
all hold. Then, whether N ’2 <N [ or N[ <N'2, the constraints (£2) and (P2) will bind in the 
optimal policy for  group 2.
PROOF: This result is most easily verified by a graphical argument. Figures 3(a) 
and 3(b) correspond to the cases N'2 <N[ and N\ < N ’2, respectively. In these figures, 
(£2) and (P2) are satisfied in the region aA’b. Suppose, contrary to the claim, that an 
optimal policy for group 2 is chosen where (£2) and (P2) are slack, at a points such as A 
in both figures. To satisfy (h), (I2), and (£ 1), group l 's  policy must lie in regions cAd. 
Consider now offering group 2 the policy A', which also satisfies (P2) and (£2), but with 
strictly lower payments. Associated with A' there is a group 1 policy B' which satisfies 
(Ii), (I2), and (£ 1), with lower payments than in regions cAd. Therefore, if (P2) and (£2)
14
Figure 2(b)
Figure 2. Optimal Policies Under Symmetric Information.
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do not bind, the solution cannot be optimal, since another feasible policy has strictly 
lower government cost.
Proposition 5: Suppose that information is asymmetric and that Conditions 1, 2, and 3 
all hold. I f  N'2 <N\, then group 1 will share group 2's policy; if N i*<N2*, then group 1 will 
have a separate policy, with the constraints (Ii) and (E\) binding, and (Pi) nonbinding.
P r o o f : Again, this claim is verified graphically. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the 
feasible sets that satisfy the remaining constraints (h ), (h), and (Ei) as regions e A f  and 
ehBJ, for the two cases, respectively. Parallel reasoning will verify both claims. 
Suppose that in the first case, group 1 does not share group 2's policy, and that in the 
second case, (Ii) and/or (Ei) are slack. Points B in the figures correspond to such 
policies, but B could not be optimal since the policies B' satisfy the same constraints 
with lower payments to group 1. To see that (Pi) is slack, suppose to the contrary that it 
binds at the optimal policy, at points B". If this were true, group 2's policy would have 
to lie on or below the curve u(] to satisfy (h) (group 1 cannot prefer group 2's policy), 
but these policies are not feasible since they do not satisfy (P2).
C o r o l l a r y : The nonnegativity conditions Ni > 0, Si > 0 will hold in the optimal 
policies.
This can be easily seen from the diagrams. The optimal policies are the points A* in 
Figure 2-4(a), and A* and B* in Figure 2-4(b), where fertilization is set exactly at the 
environmentally safe levels NT and NT- By Condition 3, these levels are strictly 
positive. Condition 3, combined with the convexity of the level sets of u‘ , implies that 
Si must be nonnegative; if producers are asked to reduce nitrogen application from N f 
to meet environmental standards, they must be compensated by a positive amount.
Policy Implications
These results have several important implications. First, if information is 
asymmetric, and if Conditions 1-3 hold and N2 < N[ (i.e., the group whose yield is most 
responsive to nitrogen, group 2, is also the most prone to leaching and runoff), separate 
policies for the two groups cannot be supported through voluntary participation. In 
this case, only one policy would be optimal; producers in both groups would apply the 
same level of nitrogen fertilizer and receive the same payment from the government. 
To meet environmental quality standards, producers in group 1 will be compensated to 
reduce nitrogen more than necessary.
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Figure 3(b)
Figure 3. Geometry of Proposition 4.
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Figure 4(a)
Figure 4(b)
Figure 4. Geometry of Proposition 5.
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If, on the other hand, N[ < N\ under asymmetric information (again assuming 
Conditions 1, 2 and 3 hold), the mechanism will allow policies to diverge across groups. 
In this case, group 2, whose yield is more sensitive to changes in nitrogen, generates a 
lower level of leaching and runoff ceteris paribus, and can therefore meet the same 
environmental quality standard with a higher fertilization rate. At the optimal policies 
in this case, the nitrogen fertilization level for both groups will meet the environmental 
quality standards exactly. If separate policies for the two groups are optimal, group 2 
producers will be indifferent between participating in the program and having no 
program at all (constraint (P2) binds), while the program will make group 1 producers 
strictly better off (constraint (Pi) is slack). Group 1 producers will benefit from the 
asymmetry of information but group 2 producers will not. If information were 
symmetric between producers and the government, optimal payments to group 1 
producers would decrease to the level that makes them indifferent between Ni° and Ni*.
In either case, a voluntary program will be more costly under asymmetric 
information than symmetric information. If only one policy is optimal, government 
costs are higher under asymmetric information because one of the groups (in this case 
group 1) is being compensated for a larger-than-necessary reduction in nitrogen 
fertilizer. If the optimal situation is for two policies, the costs to the government are 
higher because one group (again group 1 in this case) needs an added incentive to self­
select the appropriate policy. The difference in program costs between asymmetric and 
symmetric information reflects the value of information to the government. The 
magnitude of this cost would depend on the proportion of the total resource base 
belonging to group 1, and would need to be weighed against the difference in 
administrative costs between the two information regimes.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
The policy design model is implemented empirically to formulate a voluntary "green" 
program to control nitrate leaching and runoff from corn silage production in New 
York. We begin by identifying two groups of New York corn producers based on soil 
characteristics. Next, there is a presentation of the data and procedures used to 
estimate yield functions for these two groups, where corn silage yield depends on 
nitrogen fertilization and weather conditions. Nitrate leaching and runoff functions, 
which depend on nitrogen fertilization, soil characteristics, and weather, are described 
also. A stylized example based on two representative New York soils is presented to 
highlight the consistency of the empirical results with the theory under a variety of
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assumptions regarding the risk attitudes of producers, the stringency of environmental 
standards, and information regime.
The Yield Functions
Central to the theoretical results above is the assumption that two distinct groups 
of farmers could be differentiated by both the productivity and pollution potential of 
cropland. To reflect these differences, soils on farms are distinguished by hydrologic 
group.3 Group 1 is those farms with soils in hydrologic group A (which are most prone 
to nitrate losses), while group 2 farms have soils in hydrologic groups B and C. 
According to the National Resources Inventory, about 10%, 39%, and 51% of New 
York's cropland are in hydrologic groups A, B, and C, respectively (Boisvert et al., 1997 
and Thomas, 1994).
Specification
Corn yields for the two groups of producers, y‘ = t/!(N,,W), are functions of 
nitrogen fertilization levels, N), and a vector of weather variables W. To estimate these 
yield functions, the elements of the vector W must be specified, and a functional form 
for the yield relationship must also be selected. In general, W could include a large and 
detailed list of weather observations (such as daily observations of wind speed, 
humidity, precipitation, and temperature during the growing season). To achieve 
efficient estimation of the yield functions, it is important to search for measures that 
meaningfully summarize weather observations.
In a first best-scenario, W would contain a single element: a broad measure of 
weather conditions which has substantial explanatory power in predicting crop yields. 
A candidate for such a variable is the number of moisture stress days in the growing 
season, which has been shown to be empirically superior to other weather variables in 
predicting crop yields (Bailey, 1988). Moisture stress days can be calculated from daily 
observations of precipitation, temperature, and pan evaporation rates. Unfortunately, 
pan evaporation data were not available. Thus, W was specified to include two 
elements: a precipitation variable, and a measure of temperature during the growing 
season (i.e., crop yield depends explicitly on rainfall and temperature).
3Hydrologic group is a classification of soils based on their capacity to permit infiltration (Smith 
and Cassel, 1991). Group A soils are considered to be more prone to leaching than B or C soils, 
and are also generally more productive (Thomas and Boisvert, 1995).
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The precipitation variable, Wi, is defined as the total of daily rainfall 
observations from April 1 to September 30 of the crop year. Temperature conditions 
during the growing season, W2, are reflected in accumulated growing degree days. On a 
particular day, degree days are calculated by the formula:
max 0,
H - L
2
where H and L represent the daily high and low temperatures, respectively. 
Accumulated growing degree days between planting and harvesting determine the rate 
of plant growth, and hence yield. Accordingly, the variable W2 is the total of daily 
observations of degree days from May 1 to September 30 of the crop year, representing 
typical planting and harvest times for New York farms (Cornell Field Crops and Soils 
Handbook, 1987).
There is little a priori justification for using any particular functional form for 
crop response functions (Frank et al., 1990; Liang et al., 1991; Baier, 1973); logical 
candidates include the Cobb-Douglas, the generalized quadratic, and the translog 
functions. In applications, alternative functional forms are typically fit to the data, and 
the final selection is based on the statistical performance of the various functional 
specifications; this was the strategy adopted here (Heady, 1961).
The Data
Data on corn silage yield from various nitrogen application levels were available 
from field trials conducted at several sites in New York by Stuart Klausner in the 
Department of Soil, Crop, and Atmospheric Sciences at Cornell University. The base 
soils at the field trial sites are a reasonable cross-section of soils from hydrologic groups 
A, B, and C (Thomas and Boisvert, 1995). The sources of nitrogen at these field trials 
were cattle manure and inorganic fertilizer; the latter was applied at several levels at 
each site (each of these fertilization rates was also replicated, typically four times at each 
level). Where manure was applied, it was spread at a constant rate of 20 tons/acre. For 
our estimation, total nitrogen, denoted N, is defined as the sum of inorganic and 
manure nitrogen, assuming that manure contributes 3.5 pounds of nitrogen per ton 
(Cornell Field Crops and Soils Handbook, 1987; Schmit, 1994).
These field trial data were manipulated in several ways to facilitate estimation of 
the yield functions. First, the corn silage yield observed across replications of the same 
total nitrogen level at each site were averaged, generating a data set with 66
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combinations of yield and total nitrogen. Second, the data set was augmented to 
include weather variables, by using daily observations of precipitation and high and 
low temperatures from weather stations near the experimental sites. Table 1 provides 
the location of the experimental sites, the weather stations used as the sources of the 
weather data, and the mean level of the variables at each site. Finally, to alleviate 
collinearity among the weather variables, which have small variations relative to their 
means, both weather variables were centered around their long-run typical values in 
New York. The weather variables used in the estimation were 
wt = W, -  W, (z = 1,2), where Wt is the 30-year average of W, from the Ithaca weather 
station; W1 = 20.35, W2 = 2022.
Estimation Procedure
Corn silage yields (tons/acre) for the two groups (y') are thus hypothesized to depend 
on nitrogen application in lbs/acre (N), growing season rainfall (Wi) and accumulated 
growing degree days (W2). The yield functions were estimated for the 66 observations 
using Cobb-Douglas, quadratic, and translog specifications; the quadratic statistically 
outperformed the other two. Since the number of observations is limited and the cross­
sectional data imply that variation in the observed data occur from factors not captured 
by the model (such as management characteristics), several restrictions were added to 
the quadratic specification to aid in efficiency of estimation. The yield functions for the 
two groups were estimated in a pooled regression using slope and intercept dummies. 
The final model is:
y, = P» + 80d„ + p,Nt + pX  + 82(DX)
+ P 3wu + 53(Dtwu ) + P ,w2t + P5( w ,X )  +
k= 1,...66; Dk = 1 for group 2 (soils from hydrologic groups B and C), 0 otherwise; yk, and 
Nk, are the kth observation of corn silage yield, and total nitrogen, respectively; zvik and 
W2k are the kth centered observation of growing season rainfall and accumulated growing 
degree days, respectively; and £k is a mean-zero disturbance term.
The model contains the following restrictions. First, yield is assumed to respond 
in a linear fashion to changes in growing degree days.4 Second, both groups share the 
change in crop yield from a given change in Wi, ceteris paribus. Third, yield also is
4This assumption can be justified by the hypothesis that plant growth responds linearly to 
changes in temperature between 55 and 86 degrees Fahrenheit (Cornell Field Crops and Soils 
Handbook, 1987).
Table 1. Means of Data for Estimating the Yield Functions, By Experimental Site.
County Soil Name
Hydr.
Group
Weather
Station Obs.a
Total
Nitrogenc
(N)
Growing
Season
Rainfall
( W2)
Accum.
Growing
Degree
Days
( W2)
Com
Silage
Yieldd
(Y)
Delaware Tunkhannock A Walton 5 156.7 22.17 2233.5 26.64
Wyoming Chenango A Warsaw/
Portagevilleb
7 105.7 18.35 1854.4 19.23
Cayuga Lima B Aurora 16 96.3 25.02 2416.8 19.13
Chemung Unadilla B Elmira 4 87.5 19.40 2360.5 17.67
Clinton Minoa C Chazy 24 130.5 18.39 1964.3 22.33
Tompkins Collamer C Ithaca 5 170.0 16.18 2367.0 24.67
Wyoming Bath C Warsaw/
Portagevilleb
5 142.0 14.87 2082.9 20.50
66 122.8 19.90 2146.2 21.31
a Since the identical replications have been averaged, the number of observations at each site is the number of unique 
combinations of nitrogen and weather.
b The Portageville weather station is nearer to the experimental site, but does not record temperature observations.
Therefore, only precipitation data is taken from the Portageville weather station, and temperature data is from Warsaw. 
c In lbs per acre.
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same coefficient on \Nr, this assumes that both groups would experience a similar 
assumed to respond linearly to changes in rainfall; an interpretation of this restriction is 
that the yield function is linear in the range o f observed data on rainfall. Because the 
hydrologic characteristics of the soils differ, the yield functions are allowed to have 
different shapes in nitrogen5 and rainfall, and may also have different intercepts.
Since these data were generated under experimental conditions, the yield 
equations are adjusted ex post to reflect harvest losses, assumed to be 15% of the yield 
observed at the experimental sites (Thomas and Boisvert, 1995; Knoblauch and 
Milligan, 1981). Substituting the estimated coefficients, the two yield equations used in 
the model are:
y x(N ,w l ,w2) = b0 + b1N +b2Nz +b3w1 +biw2 +b5w1N
y  ^(N, Wj, w>2) =  (/?o +  do ) +  b]N +  (b2 +  dj )N^ +  (b  ^ +  df)W]_ +  64 W2 +  b^w^N, 
where =W -W i ; and bj and dj are OLS estimates of [3/ and 8/, scaled by the factor 0.85, 
and y' is predicted on-farm yield. Table 2 contains the OLS estimates for both the 
original and scaled yield equations, along with the model statistics. Evaluating the 
estimated yield equations at average weather conditions (i.e., w\ = zvi = 0) and 
fertilization rates of 100 lbs/acre, a one pound increase in nitrogen fertilizer would 
result in a 0.038 tons/acre (76 lbs/acre) and a 0.048 tons/acre (96 lbs/acre) increase in 
yield for the two groups, respectively. Group l 's  yield is more responsive to changes in 
rainfall; with nitrogen set at 100 lbs/acre, a one inch increase growing season rainfall 
would increase yield by 1.56 tons/acre for group 1, and increase yield by 0.07 tons/acre 
for group 2. For varying amounts of rainfall over several growing seasons, this implies 
that group 1 will experience more volatility in year-to-year yields than group 2. The 
response to changes in growing degree days is identical for the two groups; a 100 unit 
increase in accumulated growing degree days would result in a 0.66 tons/acre increase 
in yield for both groups.
The estimated coefficients of the model have theoretically expected signs, and the 
overall fit also appears adequate. Nonetheless, the numerous restrictions imply that the 
model used here is stark; it may provide reasonable results for the data at hand, but it is 
not intended to be a general specification appropriate for other situations. To develop a
5The linear term on nitrogen is not significantly different across the two groups when a slope 
dummy is included on the quadratic term; any difference in the shape of the yield functions can 
apparently be captured by only allowing the quadratic term to vary.
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Table 2. Estimated Yield Equations.
Variable
Base
Coefficient3 
(std. error)
Dummy 
Coefficient15 
(std. error)
Group 2 
Coefficient15
Group 1 
Scaled*1
Group 2 
Scaled*1
Intercept 16.32077
(1.618)
-5.14908
(1.712)
11.17171 13.87265 9.49594
N 0.09644
(0.015)
0.09644 0.08198 0.08198
N 2 -0.00029
(0.0000654)
0.00006
(0.000052)
-0.00024 -0.00025 -0.00020
TV  2 1.55707
(0.284)
-1.49067
(0.280)
0.06640 1.32351 0.05644
TV  2 0.00656
(0.00203)
0.00656 0.00557 0.00557
TV  2 N
Adjusted R 2 
Observations
-0.00181
(0.00120)
0.68332
66
-0.00181 -0.00154 -0.00154
a The base model corresponds to group 1.
b These are the coefficients on the product of the variables in the first column 
and the dummy variable D , e.g, N 2 D . They represent the difference between 
coefficients for group 1 and group 2. 
c Calculated as the sum of the first two columns. 
d Estimated coefficeint multiplied by 0.85.
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general specification, more data would be needed, either from additional field trials or 
from plant-growth simulators such as EPIC (Foltz et ah, 1995; Helfand and House, 1996).
Of particular concern in the empirical model is the coefficient which indicates 
the difference in shape of the yield function in nitrogen across the two groups. Based 
on the results derived above, a comparison of the marginal products of nitrogen for the 
two groups will determine whether one or two policies should be implemented under 
asymmetric information. The marginal products of nitrogen for these two yield 
functions are:
dy\N ,w u w2) 
dN
dy2{N ,wu w2)
dN
+ 2b2N + b5w1, and 
+ l(b2 + d2 )N + b5w1.
Since the marginal products differ by only the term dz, this coefficient will influence, 
directly, the government planner's choice of policies under asymmetric information.
The point estimate of dz is 0.00006, (Table 2), but the standard error of 0.00005 
implies that this parameter was not estimated with great precision. This result is 
disappointing, particularly because the empirical analysis does not provide a definitive 
answer regarding the appropriate design of policies, and also because farmers' 
conventional wisdom and agronomists' scientific judgment dictate that marginal 
productivities of nitrogen do differ across soil types such as those defined here. 
Apparently, these differences were not manifested in the cross-sectional data used in 
this analysis. For the purpose of illustrating the empirical model, and also because 
actual productivities are likely to differ, the empirical analysis proceeds using the point 
estimates given in Table 2. That is, group 2's yield is more responsive to changes in 
fertilizer for all nitrogen levels and weather variables, satisfying the condition:
dy2(N ,w 1,w2) _ dy1{N,w1,w2) 
dN > dN '
Clearly, this issue is an empirical question—one which would need to be studied more 
carefully with more data if a voluntary "green" payment program were ever 
implemented in New York.
Other Properties o f the Estimated Yield Functions
In applying the estimated yield functions to the policy design model, three key 
properties are of particular interest. First, by Proposition 1 from section 2, if the yield 
functions are strictly concave in N, the expected utility function will share the same
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property, which in turn ensures that farmers' pre-policy decision problems have unique 
solutions. To test concavity of the estimated yield functions, we examine the sign of 
d2y\N,WltW2)
dN2 ■ = 2 b.2 f
and
d2y 2(N,W lfW2)
dN2
— 2(b2 +d2).
Using the estimated coefficients (scaled) from Table 2, 2b2 = -0.00025 < 0 and 
2(b2 +d2) = -.00018 < 0. Both functions are strictly concave in N, implying that the 
solutions to the pre-policy optimal fertilization levels can be uniquely determined.
Proposition 2 from section 2 states that the "single-crossing property", which is a 
sufficient condition for optimal policies to exist under asymmetric information, will be 
upheld if the marginal product of nitrogen for one group exceeds that of the other 
group, for all relevant fertilization rates. The estimated functions satisfy this property, 
as shown above. A marginal reduction in nitrogen would require a larger increase in 
government payments for group 2 than for group 1, to keep producers at the same level 
of expected utility. This divergence in tradeoffs between N  and S in turn ensures that a 
solution to the policy design problem exists under asymmetric information.
Since production risk is incorporated in the model, the marginal effect of 
nitrogen on the variability of net returns (as measured by variance) will, in part, 
influence the compensation payments required for reductions in nitrogen. Expected 
yields for the two groups are:
E(y1) = b0+ b1N + b2N 2 + b3E(w1) + biE(w2) + b5E(w1)N , and 
E(y2) = {b0+ d0) + b1N + (b2 + d2 )N2 + (b3 + d3 )E(zv1 ) + biE(zv2) + bsE(w1 )N , 
and the corresponding variances are:
var(yJ) = (b3 +b5N)2 var(wl ) + 2bi (b3+b5N )cov(w 1,w 2) + 2bi var(io2) , and 
var(y2) = (b3 +d3 +bsN )2 var(w1) + 2bi (b3 +d3 + b5N )cov(w l ,w2) + 2b4 var(w2), 
Taking the derivatives of yield variance with respect to N,
 ^var (y1)
dN
= 2b5(b3 +b5N )var(w 1) + 2bib5 cov(zv1,w2) , and
dvar(y2)
dN 2 b5(b3 +d3 +b5N )var(w 1) + 2bib5cov(iv1,w2) .
Both derivatives depend on the estimated coefficients h?, di, bi, and bs, the variance of 
rainfall, and the covariance between rainfall and accumulated growing degree days.
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The magnitudes of these marginal effects will depend on the variance and covariance of 
the weather variables in the region studied. In principle, an increase in nitrogen 
fertilizer could lead to either an increase or a decrease in yield variability.
Nitrate Leaching and Runoff Functions
The environmental component of the model, which serves to determine the 
environmentally safe levels of nitrogen fertilization for two groups, requires functions 
relating the amount of nitrate leaching and runoff to fertilization levels and weather 
conditions. The functions used for this purpose are taken from Boisvert et al., (1997).6 
These statistical relationships relate nitrate leaching and runoff on New York soils to 
nitrogen application, five soil characteristics, and several rainfall variables (Table 3). 
They are estimated from runoff and leaching data generated by GLEAMS (Leonard et 
a l,  1987) representing 1,350 combinations of weather, soil characteristics, and nitrogen 
levels. Using predicted values of runoff in the leaching equation was equivalent to an 
instrumental variable procedure for this recursive system (Judge et al., 1988). To help in 
the interpretation of these functions which are quadratic in logarithms (Bailey and 
Boisvert, 1991), the elasticities of leaching and runoff are reported for mean levels of the 
important explanatory variables, and for the most part, have expected signs. Further, 
Boisvert et al. (1997) report that the leaching equation predicts well, particularly in the 
upper tail which is most critical for policy purposes.
An Empirical Demonstration
To illustrate the empirical model, we consider a simple example using specific 
but somewhat arbitrarily selected soils to represent each group. We begin by defining 
simulated distributions of net returns for the two groups of farmers. Farmers' 
preferences over these distributions are specified under alternative assumptions 
regarding attitudes toward risk. Next, the specific soils are described in terms of their 
potential to generate environmental damage, and the levels of nitrogen fertilizer that
6Nitrate loss is defined as the sum of nitrate leaching (nitrates leached beyond the root zone of 
plants) and nitrate runoff (nitrates flowing off fields in rainwater and into surface water 
supplies). Using nitrate loss as a measure of pollution implicitly assigns equal weight to the 
environmental consequences of nitrate leaching and nitrate runoff. In any particular area, these 
weights would depend, among other factors, on the relative importance of ground and surface 
water for human consumption; in general the weights would not be equal and would vary from 
location to location. If such a program were implemented, more research would be needed to 
assign appropriate weights to the sources of nitrate pollution in different areas.
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Table 3. Regression Equations for Nitrogen Runoff and Leaching.
Variable3 Units Description
Constant
L(NITRUN) lbs/acre Nitrogen runoff
L(NITRUN)SQ
L(H1) inches Soil horizon depth
L(SLP) 0//o Average field slope
L(SLP)L(H1)
L(KAY) K erodibility factor
L(KAY)L(H1)
L(ORG) 0//o Organic Matter
(LORG)SQ
L(ORG)L(Hl)
L(MINN) lbs/acre Nitrogen mineralized by soil
L(RAIN) inches Total annual rainfall
L(PRSTM) inches Rainfall within 14 days of planting
(LPRSTM)SQ
L(NIT)L(PRSTM)
L(FRSTM) inches Rain within 14 days of fertilizer
(LFRSTM)SQ
L(LBMAN) lbs/acre Total fertilizer
L(ROT) Years of corn in rotation
LAGCORN Dummy, com previous year
L(HRSTM) inches Rain within 14 days of harvest
HYDA Dummy, hydrologic soil group A
HYDB Dummy, hydrologic soil group B
MANURE Dummy, manure application
Source: Boisvert, et al. (1997).
a Except for the dummy variables, the variables are logarithmic transformations; 
some of the variables represent a square of the logarithm (sq) or the product of 
two logarithms. NITRUN is the logarithm of estimated runoff from the runoff 
equations.
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Table 3. (Continued)
________ Runoff________  _______ Leaching_______
Variable____________  Coef. t-ratioP Elast. Coef. t-ratio Elast.
R2=0.509 R2=0.494
Constant
L(NITRUN)L
L(NITRUN)SQ
L(H1)
L(SLP)
L(SLP)L(H1)
L(KAY)
L(KAY)L(H1)
L(ORG)
(LORG)SQ
L(ORG)L(Hl)
L(MINN)
L(RAIN)
L(PRSTM)
(LPRSTM)SQ
L(NIT)L(PRSTM)
L(FRSTM)
(LFRSTM)SQ
L(LBMAN)d
L(ROT)
LAGCORN
L(HRSTM)
HYDA
HYDB
MANURE11
-4.402 -7.02
0.058 2.09 0.06
3.241 9.24 0.26
-1.039 -8.47
-0.581 -6.60 -0.58
0.652 15.27 0.65
0.089 5.94 0.01
0.023 6.47
-0.01
0.005 5.82
0.628 7.05 0.63
-0.453 -23.06
-75.568 -9.35
-6.739 -4.38 -4.52
2.119 1.76
5.638 7.33 0.21
-1.154 -4.37 -0.46
0.453 2.66
-5.594 -7.91 -2.11
2.287 6.80
5.235 5.51 2.00
-2.127 -5.01
5.442 5.81 5.44
5.768 9.33 5.77
0.10
0.056 3.34
0.363 3.75
0.256 5.05 0.10
0.094 6.59
4.824 4.78 4.82
-0.627 -4.55 -0.63
-0.668 -6.49
0.039 1.18 0.04
0.290 2.87
-0.359 -22.11
0.235 1.62
Source: Boisvert, et al. (1997).
D Chi-square test statistics for heteroskedasticity were 229 for the runoff equation 
and 246 for the leaching equations. Standard errors were recalculated as 
the square root of the diagonal elements of the estimated asymptotic covariance 
These standard errors are consistent (White, 1980). 
c To purge the runoff variables from any unexplained random component, the 
predicted values from the runoff equation are used in the leaching equation 
(Judge et a l ., 1988).
a Commercial fertilizer application is combined with the nitrogen equivalent 
included in the various rates of manure application; any differential effect is 
captured through a dummy variable.
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meet environmental quality standards are determined. These fertilization levels, in 
conjunction with farmers' preferences over the simulated net returns distributions, 
determine the optimal policies. The optimal policies are calculated both under 
symmetric and asymmetric information.
Net Return Distributions
Distributions of net returns are simulated over the 30-year period, 1963-1992. 
The elements of the simulated distribution are, for nitrogen level N,
Rl(N) = pty i(N,W u ,W2t) - r tN -V
where t = 1 ,... ,3 0 ; y'(N,W lt,Wlt) are from Table 2; pt and rt are the real prices of corn 
silage and nitrogen fertilizer in year t; and V is non-nitrogen variable cost. Data on 
prices, weather, and variable production costs are needed to calculate the elements of 
this distribution.
Because corn silage is traded in a very thin market in New York, silage prices 
over the 30 years, pt, are imputed from New York corn grain prices (Thomas, 1994). 
Corn grain prices, corn grain yields, and silage yields are taken from New York
ycpc
Agricultural Statistics. Silage prices for each year are calculated by pt = { 1 , where y'\
Dt
and pct are the reported per-acre yield and price of corn grain in year t, and yt is the 
reported per-acre yield of corn silage. The computed prices are converted to constant 
1992 dollars with the Index of Prices Received by Farmers (1977=100). These real prices 
for the 30 years are shown in Appendix Table B-l.
Similarly, real nitrogen fertilizer prices, rt, are based on the price of urea in New 
York, as reported in New York Agricultural Statistics (Appendix Table B-2). The prices of 
nitrogen fertilizer are converted to a per-pound of nitrogen basis (urea contains 43% 
nitrogen), and are deflated by the Index of Prices Paid by Farmers (1977=100).
Typical New York variable production costs for corn, excluding nitrogen, are in 
Appendix Table B-3; the sum of these expenses is represented in the model as V. These 
expenses are taken from corn enterprise budgets in Schmit (1994), and from USDA-ERS 
Economic Indicators o f the Farm Sector: Field Crops and Dairy, 1992. To maintain
consistency with the price data, the costs are converted to constant 1992 dollars with the 
Index of Prices Paid by farmers (1977=100).
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For this demonstration the Ithaca, New York weather station is used to represent 
regional weather conditions. Appendix Table B-4 shows the weather variables over the 
30 years.
Risk Preferences
In the empirical policy design model, producers in both groups are assumed to 
have a negative exponential utility function. The policy design problem under symmetric 
information (described conceptually by problem (6) above) becomes:
(11) min A S .+ A S ,
(S,,S2,N,,N2) 11
subject to: N, < N * , i = 1,2, (Ei)
i  30 -i 30
T A -e x p M R / fN .H S ,) ]^ —  X -exp[-a(R ,, (Nf) + 0)] (Pi)
oU (=1 oU (=1
•I 30 -I 30
— £ -e x p H (R ,z(N2) + S2)]> —  £-exp[-fl(R ,2(N2“) + 0)] (Pz)
j U t=1 j U (=1
N, > 0, Si> 0, i=l,2,
where A, is the number of corn acres in each group, N* are the maximum levels of N 
that meet environmental quality standards, a is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion,7 and R't(Nj) + S,- represents income from corn production and government 
payments if weather and price conditions in year t are realized. Constraints (E;) ensure 
that the post-policy nitrogen rates will satisfy environmental quality standards. 
Constraints (Pi) require that post-policy expected utility, calculated from the simulated 
net return distribution, is no less than if farmers choose not to participate in the 
program.
If information is asymmetric, the policy design problem is (11) with the 
additional incentive compatibility constraints:
•1 30 -1 30
— X  -e x p M R ,’(N,) + S ,)] a e x p [ - fl(R,‘(N2) + S2)] (/,)
3(J (=1 31) (=1
i  30 -1 30
—  X -exp[-«(R ,2(N2) + S2)] > —  X - e x p I - n ^ N ,) + S ,)] (h)
3U f=1 3U f=1
The negative exponential utility function has been criticized in the literature 
because it imposes constant absolute risk aversion, a property which is not upheld by
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empirical evidence (Saha et a l ,  1994). Despite such criticism, the negative exponential 
function is still used widely in applications, mainly because of its other useful 
properties. Since the degree of risk aversion is included explicitly as the parameter a, 
the changes in optimal policies that result from various specifications of this parameter 
can be interpreted as consequences of various degrees of risk aversion.
The unknown parameter a is varied over three alternative values: 0, 0.01, and 
0.03. The first value represents the case of risk neutrality, while the second and third 
are selected to explore the effect of varying degrees of risk aversion. The second and 
third coefficients fall within the range of results from empirical investigations of risk 
attitudes (Simmons and Pomareda, 1975; Wiens, 1976; Brink and McCarl, 1978; Buccola, 
1982; Love and Buccola, 1991). Though a is varied across alternative levels, both groups 
of producers are always assumed to share the same parameter. This is a simplification 
in the empirical model; as shown in section 2 above, the qualitative results are 
maintained even with arbitrary utility functions for both groups.7 8 Using the same 
degree of risk aversion for both groups will allow the results to be interpreted with 
more clarity9.
Initial Fertilization Levels
To determine optimal pre-policy fertilization levels for risk aversion parameters,
3 0  ^
0, 0.01, and 0.03, the function ^  -  exp[-flP) (N,)] was maximized over N, directly.10
t=i
These fertilization rates denoted Nt° , were determined for each of the assumptions
7The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is defined as ~(u" / u'). For the 
negative exponential utility function, this coefficient remains constant across all income levels 
(Mas-Collel et al, 1995).
8Appendix C describes an alternative formulation of the empirical model where the utility 
functions for both groups are unrestricted within the class of increasing and strictly concave 
functions.
9 Even though expected utility in this model is calculated on a per-acre basis, the results can be 
also be interpreted in terms of a whole-farm analysis. Since the parameter a and income are 
multiplied together in the exponent of the utility function, equivalent results can be obtained by 
multiplying income by a constant, and dividing a by the same constant (Tauer, 1985). In 
particular, for a farm with B acres of corn, specifying the parameter a at a* would represent an 
Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient of a*/.B. Fixing B at 100 acres, for example, the 
three values of a would correspond to Arrow-Pratt coefficients of absolute risk aversion of 0, 
0.0001, and 0.0003.
iojhe case of a = 0 (risk neutrality) reduces to maximizing the net returns function R't (N ,).
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regarding risk aversion and are shown in Table 4, along with the corresponding means 
and standard deviations in net returns. The differences in application rates and net 
returns are small, but the differences gain added significance under the "green" 
payment policies. Optimal fertilization rates also increase as higher levels of risk 
aversion are assumed for group 1 but decrease with risk aversion for group 2. This 
result implies that nitrogen fertilizer affects the amount of risk borne by producers.
Table 4. Optimal Pre-Policy Nitrogen Levels, by Risk Aversion Level.
Risk
Aversion
Coef.
Group 1 Group 2
Nitrogen 
Fertilizer 
(lb/acre)* 3 *
Net Returns Nitrogen Net Returns
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Fertilizer 
(lb/acre)3 Mean
Standard
Deviation
0.00 129 $188.44 $108.70 160 $121.65 $53.46
0.01 133 188.34 108.34 156 121.59 53.22
0.03 135 188.26 108.21 150 121.24 52.80
a These nitrogen levels are N in the model.
If the variance of net returns is used to measure risk (Just and Pope, 1979), the 
changes in optimal fertilization rates can be understood in terms of the marginal 
variance effect of nitrogen on yield. As noted previously, the marginal effect of 
nitrogen on the variance of net returns depends on the estimated coefficients of the 
yield functions, as well as the variance and covariance of the regional weather variables. 
In the relevant range of fertilization rates, the derivatives are negative for group 1 and 
positive for group 2.3 Accordingly, nitrogen fertilizer is a risk-reducing input for group 1 
and a risk-increasing input for group 2. Group 1 producers who are more risk averse 
will increase fertilization levels in order to take advantage of its stabilizing effect on net 
returns. Conversely, risk averse group 2 producers will decrease nitrogen fertilization
Bvarjy1)  ^ 3var(y2) „
3 — ----< 0 for all N < 827.97; ------------- > 0 for all N > 3.37. Inserting the appropriate yield
function coefficients from Table 2, and the variance of rainfall along with the covariance 
between rainfall and growing degree days from Table 7, the marginal changes in yield variance 
with respect to nitrogen are:
<9var(5) ) = (9 .9 6 x 1 0_5)IV -0.0824 and d v ^   ^ = (9.96 x 10~5) AT-0.0003365
dN 3N
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rates in order to avoid volatility in net returns. As one would expect, for a higher 
degree of risk aversion, the optimal net return distributions for both groups have lower 
expected values, but are also less variable.
The pre-policy optimal fertilization rates in Table 4, for group 2 exceed those of 
group 1 for all levels of risk aversion. This result is qualitatively consistent with 
optimal rates in a deterministic world; as shown above, the marginal product of 
nitrogen for group 2 is everywhere larger than group 1. The important implication here 
is that Condition 2 from the theoretical model is satisfied, i.e.,N° > N °.
Environmental Quality Standards
The soil characteristics for the two groups are based on "com posite" soils, 
defined as a simple average of two representative soils in the appropriate group. Two 
hydrologic group A soils were chosen to represent group 1, and two hydrologic group 
B soils represent group 2 (Table 5). Distributions of leaching and runoff in the Central
Table 5. Characteristics of the Selected Soils.
Characteristic Symbol
Group 1 Soils Group 2 Soils
ChB HdD Ln MoC
Hydrologic Group HYD A A B B
Soil horizon
depth (inches) HI 2.36 9.84 14.17 10.24
Average field slope (%) SLP 5.50 20.00 1.50 11.50
K erodibility factor KAY 0.320 0.240 0.280 0.320
Organic Matter (%) ORG 7.50 4.06 10.00 6.06
Nitrogen mineralized
by soil (lbs/acre) MINN 69.0 69.0 64.1 73.9
New York region can be simulated by evaluating the functions in Boisvert et al. (1997) at 
the appropriate soil characteristics, a specified fertilization level, and the weather 
conditions observed at the Ithaca weather station in each of the 30 years (Figures 5 and 
6).
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Cumulative Probability
Figure 5. Distribution of Nitrate Leaching and Runoff on 
Group 1 Soils, Alternative Safety Levels.
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Figure 6. Distribution of Nitrate Leaching and Runoff for Group 2 
Soils, Alternative Safety Levels.
Figures 5 and 6 also show the distributions for the maximum fertilization rates 
which satisfy three alternative chance constraints: L*= 40, 30, and 20 lbs of combined 
leaching and runoff per acre, where the probability of exceeding these levels was set at 
a  = 0.1. Fertilization rates which meet the chance constraint (L*,0.1), L* = 40, 30, 20, will 
generate, in this empirical setting, predicted levels of leaching and runoff above L* for 
at most 3 of the 30 years. To determine the nitrogen levels on these soils which will 
meet the specified environmental quality standards, various nitrogen rates were
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iteratively substituted into the nitrate leaching and runoff functions in Boisvert et al. 
(1997). The maximum nitrogen fertilization levels (to the nearest pound per acre) which 
meet the environmental quality standards (40,0.1), (30,0.1), and (20,0.1) are in Table 6, 
along with the associated means and standard deviations in net returns.
Several observations can be made from Table 6. First, as one would expect, if 
environmental quality standards become more stringent, fertilization rates must be 
reduced and there is a corresponding reduction in mean net returns for both groups. 
Comparing the optimal fertilization rates from Table 6 to the optimal pre-policy rates in 
Table 4, theoretical Condition 3 is satisfied for each safety level; i.e., 
0 < N* < min{N° ,N °} (i = 1/2). Producers in group 1 apply less nitrogen than group 2
producers in order to meet any given environmental quality standard, i.e., N[ < N\ for
all L*. These results, combined with the previous result that ^  ^  T , imply that
BN BN
group 2 requires more compensation for reductions in nitrogen, but can satisfy 
environmental quality standards with higher fertilization rates than group 1. By 
theoretical Proposition 4, these conditions imply that separate policies for the two 
groups will be optimal.
The Policies
To isolate the effect of asymmetric information, separate optimal policies for each 
producer group are determined both where information is symmetric and also where it 
is asymmetric. Each of these cases is discussed in turn, including an examination of the 
effect of risk aversion on optimal policies.
Symmetric Information: When information is symmetric, optimal compensation
payments would make producers indifferent between their initial situation and the 
environmentally safe nitrogen levels (Table 7 and Figure 7). Payments range from $4 to 
$26/acre for group 1 and $2 to $25/acre for group 2. A striking feature of these 
payments is that payments increase with the degree of risk aversion for group 1, and 
decrease with risk aversion for group 2. Since nitrogen reduces risk for group 1 and pre­
policy fertilization levels increase with the level of risk aversion (Table 4), this group 
suffers a larger reduction in fertilizer and net returns as the level of risk aversion 
increases. Group 2 producers decrease pre-policy fertilization levels for higher risk 
aversion levels; thus the reduction in fertilizer and net returns decreases with risk 
aversion for group 2.
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Table 6. Environmentally Safe Levels of Nitrogen.
Safety
Level3
Group 1 Group 2
Nitrogen
Fertilizer
(lbs/acre )b
Net Returns Nitrogen
Fertilizer
(lbs/acre )b
Net Returns
Mean
Standard
Deviation Mean
Standard
Deviation
40 99 $184.11 $110.33 128 $117.55 $51.09
30 84 178.63 110.94 109 111.29 49.29
20 63 164.87 111.51 80 96.26 45.95
a L* for a  = 0.1; i.e., levels of combined leaching and runoff (lbs/acre) to be exceeded less 
than 10% of the time.
b N  j* ; i.e., maximum levels of N  for the two groups that meet the standard (L* ,0.1).
Table 7. Optimal Green Payments, by Safety Level.
Safety
Level
( n
Risk
Aversion
Paramete
r
(«)
Symmetric
Information
Asymmetric
Information
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
40 0.00 4.34 4.11 8.44 4.11
40 0.01 5.45 3.01 8.33 3.01
40 0.03 5.88 1.63 7.29 1.63
30 0.00 9.82 10.36 18.27 10.36
30 0.01 11.28 8.40 16.94 8.40
30 0.03 11.84 5.67 14.45 5.67
20 0.00 23.57 25.39 37.32 25.39
20 0.01 25.39 21.88 34.09 21.88
20 0.03 26.27 16.62 29.11 16.62
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Figure 7. Green Payments Under Symmetric Information.
Payments under symmetric information could be called "equitable" because all 
producers are indifferent to their pre-policy situation. For the risk neutral case, the size 
of the government payments are similar for the two groups, but as a percentage of 
initial net returns, the payments are less similar: for L*=20 and a = 0, "green" payments 
make up about 13% and 21% of initial net returns for the two groups, respectively.
Asymmetric Information: If information is asymmetric, "green" payments must 
be set so that the self-selection conditions are satisfied, in addition to the environmental 
and participation constraints. We might expect optimal payments to be higher in this 
case because additional constraints have been imposed on the policy design problem 
(Table 7 and Figure 8).
These payments range from $7 to $37 for group 1 and $2 to $25 for group 2. The 
optimal payments to group 2 are exactly the same as in the symmetric information case 
because the self-selection constraint for this group always binds, i.e., group 2 will never 
benefit from a "green" payment program. In contrast, producers in group 1 need an 
additional incentive to self-select their own policy over the one designed for group 2. 
Indeed, the "green" payments associated with group l 's  policies increase by about one-
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half over the symmetric information case. For a safety level of 30 lbs of nitrate loss per 
acre, the average windfall benefit (payment in excess of the loss in net returns) to group 
1 is about $6 per acre.
Figure 8. Green Payments Under Asymmetric Information.
Under asymmetric information optimal payments to both groups decrease as 
higher degrees of risk aversion are assumed. The underlying cause for this increase is 
the risk-increasing effect of nitrogen application for group 2; as in the case of symmetric 
information, pre-policy fertilization rates for this group will be smaller for higher 
degrees of risk aversion (Table 4), and the reduction in nitrogen and net returns will 
also be smaller. Group l 's  payments are determined by comparing group 2's policy to 
their own. Since the difference in nitrogen application for these two policies is fixed for 
all levels of risk aversion, smaller payments to group 2 imply that payments to group 1 
can also be reduced.
Two additional issues concerning risk are addressed in Appendices C and D. 
Appendix C describes an alternative formulation of the policy design model where the 
utility functions for both groups are left unspecified. In this more general formulation, 
the net return distributions arising from alternative fertilization levels are compared 
using the second-degree stochastic dominance criterion; the Optimal policies from this 
model are sufficient for any risk averse farmer to participate in the program and choose 
his or her own policy. Even though this formulation is more general, it is also more 
complicated. No simple conditions can be derived which guarantee the existence of a
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solution to the policy design problem, and the properties of the solution are analytically 
intractable. In the New York case studied here, payments have the same qualitative 
structure as in the expected utility framework, and quantitatively the payments differ 
by no more than $2 per acre between the two models.
Besides a specific utility function, the model discussed here also assumes that 
two sources of risk are relevant; yield risk due to weather and price uncertainty are 
both explicitly incorporated in the policy design problem. In Appendix D, the variance 
of net returns is decomposed into price and yield components, and the effects of 
ignoring one or both sources of risk are analyzed. Both sources of risk make up an 
important share of overall net return variability, and if either source of risk is ignored, 
the quantitative results of the model are substantially changed.
APPLICATION TO CORN PRODUCTION IN THREE NEW YORK REGIONS
Having used a stylized example to illustrate the models' consistency with the 
theory and to better understand the relative importance of the two sources of risk, we 
turn designing a voluntary "green" payment program to control nitrate leaching and 
runoff in three New York regions. To simulate the policy response within each region, 
information on representative soils defined for two groups of producers from data on 
the distribution of soils over a sample of New York farms (Boisvert et ah, 1997) are 
combined with weather data from each region to solve for optimal region-level policies 
for various environmental quality standards.
The analysis proceeds by first defining the parameters of the regional policy 
design models, the three farming regions in New York, and the data used to simulate 
the program. Representative distributions of environmental damage and net returns 
are generated within each region, based on representative soils and weather conditions. 
Pre-policy optimal nitrogen levels are then determined from the simulated net return 
distributions, under the assumption that farmers maximize expected utility.
In the following sections, the regional models are solved to determine optimal 
policies which achieve various environmental quality standards. In the first of these 
scenarios, environmental quality standards require relative reductions from initial levels 
of environmental damage within each region. As an alternative approach, the next 
section employs absolute standards, which impose uniform levels of post-policy 
environmental quality across all regions. Finally, the findings are summarized, and the 
major implications of the regional policies are briefly highlighted.
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Parameters of the Regional Models
Production Regions and Soils Data
The production regions in New York (Figure 9 and Table 8) chosen for this 
analysis approximately follow some of the farm management regions used in the 
Cornell Dairy Farm Business Records Project (Smith et ah, 1993). Data from a sample of 
142 New York farms across these regions provide the basis for the simulation. These 
data are taken from a larger survey of 300 farms conducted by the Niagara Mowhawk 
Power Company, and are described more fully in Boisvert et al. (1997) and Kelleher and 
Bills (1989). The data include, among other variables, each farm's location, the acreage 
of individual soils on each farm and crops grown, and the characteristics of each soil.
Table 8. Agricultural Production Characteristics, By Region.
CENNY EASPLT WESPLN
Total Cropland (acres) 954811 662563 888931
Number of Farms 5499 4590 4641
Average Farm Size (acres) 174 144 192
Value of Products Sold ($1000)a 466095 312620 447438
Value of Products per Acre ($) 488 472 503
Value of Products per Farm ($) 84760 68109 96410
Net Cash Return ($1000)b 76833 62706 57609
Net Cash Return per Acre ($) 80 95 65
Net Cash Return per Farm ($) 13972 13661 12413
Corn Acreage 289443 123883 227508
Proportion of Corn Acreagec 30% 19% 26%
Source: 1992 Census of Agriculture. 
a Gross value of all agricultural products, before taxes.
b Value of Products Sold less operating expenses. These operating expenses do not
include depreciation and changes in inventory. 
c Com  acreage as a percentage of total cropland.
T o p  No. =  F a r m s  i n  S a m p l e
B o t t o m  No. =  C o r n l a n d  i n  S a m p l e  ( a c r e s )
(?
Figure 9. Three Production Regions in New York.
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Table 9. Average Soil Characteristics by Region3.
Variable Descripton CENNY
Region
EASPLT WESPLN
HYDA Proportion of Hydrologic Group A Soils'3 0.04 0.21 0.07
(0.01) (0.11) (0.08)
HYDB Proportion of Hydrologic Group B Soils'3 0.71 0.38 0.31
(0.66) (0.14) (0.43)
HYDC Proportion of Hydrologic Group C Soils'3 0.25 0.41 0.62
(0.32) (0.75) (0.48)
HI Soil Horizon Depth (in) 4.725 7.296 6.169
MINN Nitrogen mineralized by soil (lbs/acre) 71.322 72.008 70.071
SLOPE Average field slope (%) 6.093 6.514 4.825
KAY K erodibility factor 0.306 0.299 0.296
OG Organic matter (%) 4.554 4.397 4.742
Source: Boisvert, et al. (1997).
a Weighted average, by the number of acres of each soil in the sample.
b Proportion of soils in sample (the 1982 National Resource Inventory) in each of the hydrologic groups
The regions reflect differences in topography, soils, climate, and land use 
(Table 9). The Eastern Plateau (EASPLT) region lies entirely in the Appalachian 
Uplands physiographic province, known in New York as the Allegheny Plateau. This 
region is characterized by flat-topped hills with long slopes and large, flat valleys. The 
valley sides are often relatively steep, especially at the upper slopes (SCS, 1973). The 
southern section of Central New York (CENNY) is also part of the Allegheny Plateau; 
the northern part is in the Erie-Ontario Plain, made up of deep soils with gentle to 
moderate slope (SCS, 1977). The Western Plain (WESPLN) region also lies partly in the 
Allegheny Plateau, but much of the region is in the Ontario Lowlands. The Ontario 
Lowlands have a gently rolling topography, with differences in elevation usually less 
than 30 feet (SCS, 1974).
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The soils in WESPLN are generally quite productive and well-suited for growing 
the crops used on dairy farms (SCS, 1974). Wyoming county in this region, with 350 
dairy farms, is one of the most highly concentrated dairy areas in New York. Farms 
tend to be larger in WESPLN than in the other two regions, both in terms of acreage and 
gross sales. Corn is an important crop in all three regions, consuming one-fifth or more 
of total agricultural cropland.
Table 10 contains the average values of selected soil characteristics for the farms 
in each region, based on the 142-farm sample. The averages of the variables HYDA, 
HYDB, and HYDC are the proportions of the sample acreage which belong to each 
hydrologic group. For comparison with these sample-based proportions, the 
corresponding proportions from the 1982 National Resources Inventory are also 
reported. The 142-farm sample is fairly representative of the actual distribution of soils 
across hydrologic groups, with the possible exception of the EASPLT region, which 
appears to have too high a proportion of hydrologic group A soils (Boisvert et al., 1997).
The weather variables in each region are defined by observations at a selected 
weather station. Weather conditions in the CENNY region, taken from the Ithaca 
weather station, were used in the empirical demonstration above (Appendix Table B-4). 
Appendix Tables B-5 and B-6 contain the weather variables for the EASPLT and 
WESPLN regions, respectively, The remaining parameters in the policy design model, 
corn prices, nitrogen prices, and variable production costs, are assumed not to vary by 
region and are reported in Appendix Tables B -l, B-2, and B-3, respectively.
Representative Soils for Producer Groups
The policies are simulated for two groups of producers within each region, 
assuming there is a "representative agent" for each group of producers in each region. 
The amount of leaching and runoff generated by each group is calculated from the 
characteristics of a "representative" soil, which are a weighted average of the soils in 
the group from the 142-farm sample. As in the demonstration above, group 1 
corresponds to hydrologic group A soils, while hydrologic group B and C soils 
constitute group 2.
For the three regions, a corn acreage weighted average of five soil characteristics, 
which are the independent variables in the leaching and runoff equations, was 
calculated for each group (Table 10). One noticeable difference in these characteristics 
across regions is the proportion of hydrologic group B and C soils in group 2.
Table 10. Average Soil Characteristics by Region and Group.
CENNY Region EASPLT Region WESPLN Region
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
Variable Description (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C)
HYD1 Proportion of Group 1 
from each Hyd. Group 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
HYD2 Proportion of Group 2 
from each Hyd. Group 0.00 0.74 0.26 0.00 0.48 0.52 0.00 0.34 0.66
HI Soil Horizon Depth (in) 4.2 4.7 4.7 5.9 6.5 3.0 8.5 6.3 5.8
MINN Nitrogen mineralized 
by soil (lbs/acre) 63.9 73.5 66.3 69.9 70.7 67.0 69.7 70.9 69.7
SLOPE Average field slope (%) 5.2 6.9 3.9 7.5 8.6 7.1 6.3 5.1 4.5
KAY K erodibility factor 0.20 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.24 0.30 0.30
OG Organic matter (%) 3.9 4.6 4.6 4.1 4.9 4.1 4.1 4.6 4.9
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Hydrologic group B soils make up the largest proportion of group 2 in the CENNY 
region. These proportions of B and C soils are nearly reversed in the WESPLN region, 
and in EASPLT group 2 is split almost equally between B and C soils. Many of the 
remaining soil characteristics are similar across regions and groups; based on inspection 
of the soil characteristics alone, it is difficult to predict the relative severity of leaching 
and runoff among the groups.
From the representative soil characteristics and regional weather conditions, 
simulated 30-year distributions of leaching and runoff can be generated. As described 
earlier, the leaching and runoff functions in Table 3 are evaluated at the representative 
regional soil characteristics (Table 10), for weather conditions in each of the 30 years 
(Appendix Tables B-4, B-5, and B-6). In these leaching and runoff functions, the variable 
ROTN was set to 4 years, representing a typical rotation pattern on New York farms 
(Schmit, 1994), and the variable LAGCORN was set to 0.75 (with a four year corn 
rotation, 25% of corn acreage will be first-year corn).12 The leaching and runoff for 
group 2 is calculated as a weighted average of B and C soils, with the proportions of 
soils in group 2 as weights.
Pre-Policy Levels o f Nitrogen and Environmental Quality
Assuming that farmers maximize expected utility, optimal pre-policy 
fertilization rates are determined from the 30-year distributions of net returns. These 
distributions are generated from the estimated yield equations (Table 2), weather data 
(Appendix Tables B-4, B-5, and B-6), corn prices (Appendix Table B-l), nitrogen prices 
(Appendix Table B-2), and production costs (Appendix Table B-3). A negative 
exponential utility function is assumed, where the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion is varied over the values 0, 0.01, and 0.03. Once the pre-policy fertilization 
rates are known, the simulated distributions of leaching and runoff which correspond 
to these nitrogen levels will represent the pre-policy probability distribution of 
environmental damage.13 As a measure of pre-policy environmental quality, we
12Thus, the calculated quantities of leaching and runoff represent average levels of nitrate loss 
over the corn rotation.
13The nitrogen rates on first year corn are likely to be lower than the calculated optimal rates, 
which are for continuous com. Consequently, the pre-policy levels of environmental damage 
may be overestimated, since nitrogen levels are assumed fixed throughout the rotation. 
However, this does not affect relative comparisons of alternative fertilization levels.
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examine the implied initial safety levels; i.e., the amount of nitrate loss which is exceeded 
10% of the time at initial fertilization rates.
Table 11 provides the pre-policy fertilization levels, per acre average net returns, 
and implied safety levels, by producer group and region. The fertilization rates for 
group 1 range from 129 to 145 Ibs/acre, while those for group 2 range from 150 to 165 
lbs/acre; variation in these optimal rates across regions is due to the different 
distributions of regional weather conditions. In all three regions, group l 's  optimal 
fertilization levels increase for higher degrees of risk aversion, and group 2's rates 
decrease. This phenomenon implies that the different distributions of weather variables 
across regions do not alter the marginal risk effects of nitrogen, always reducing risk for 
group 1 and increasing risk for group 2. As one would expect, risk averse farmers are 
willing to trade off average levels of net returns in exchange for less volatility in net 
returns.
Not surprisingly, the implied safety levels on nitrate loss increase with initial 
nitrogen fertilization rates. The safety levels, however, vary across regions much more 
than optimal fertilization rates, implying substantial spatial variation in the severity of 
pre-policy nitrate loss levels. For both groups, the implied safety levels in CENNY and 
WESPLN are nearly double those in EASPLT, even though the nitrogen fertilization 
levels in all three regions are similar. These substantial differences in pollution levels 
arise both from the varying weather conditions across regions and from differences in 
representative soil characteristics.
The implied safety levels in Table 11 are somewhat lower than those in the 
example above because those soils were more prone to nitrate losses than the 
representative soils within the three production regions. Further, the safety levels 
represent predicted levels of combined leaching and runoff from the GLEAMS simulator. 
The precision of these predictions, in absolute terms, are not known since actual 
leaching and runoff cannot be measured. However, relative changes in these 
predictions are assumed to be associated with proportional changes in actual nitrate 
loss. For example, the estimated initial safety level in the WESPLN region for group 1 (a 
= 0.03) is 24 Ibs/acre. The absolute magnitude of this estimate is not as important as its 
relative value: in WESPLN, group 2 producers generate about half the amount of pre­
policy nitrate loss (12 lbs/acre) as does group 1.
Table 11. Pre-Policy Levels of Production and Environmental Damage.
Risk
Parameter3
Optimal Nitrogen 
(Implied Safety Level)b
Mean Net Returns 
(Standard Dev.)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
CENNY Region
0.00 129 lb/a 160 lb/a $188.44 $121.65
(14 lb/a) (15 lb/a) ($108.65) ($53.46)
0.01 133 156 188.34 121.59
(15) (14) (108.33) (53.22)
0.03 135 150 188.26 121.24
(16) (13) (108.21) (52.80)
EASPLT Region
0.00 132 165 173.53 135.98
(10) (8) (106.13) (56.77)
0.01 137 159 173.44 135.88
(10) (7) (105.83) (56.38)
0.03 138 151 173.37 135.28
(10) (7) (105.71) (55.71)
WESPLN Region
0.00 131 164 178.7 135.08
(18) (14) (110.20) (57.81)
0.01 138 158 178.51 134.95
(21) (13) (109.73) (57.32)
0.03 145 151 177.8 134.43
(24) (12) (109.21) (56.68)
a Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
b Amount of combined leaching and runoff exceeded in 3 out of 30 (i.e., with
(probability 0.1) at initial fertilization rates.
Optimal Policies to Achieve Relative Reductions in Environmental Damage
Optimal payments are determined when the environmental policy objective is to 
achieve relative reductions in pre-policy leaching and runoff levels within each region. 
To accomplish this objective, the nitrate loss safety levels are used as measures of
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environmental damage, and two alternative environmental standards are examined: a 
20% and a 40% reduction from pre-policy regional safety levels. Since the absolute 
levels of leaching and runoff vary substantially by region (Table 12), these relative 
standards provide a consistent basis for comparing the costs of improved 
environmental quality across diverse regions.
Table 12. Safety Levels for Relative Reductions in Leaching and Runoff, by Region.
Standard
Safety Level (lbs leaching & runoff/ acre)
CENNY EASPLT WESPLN
Initial 14.0 8.2 14.3
20% Reduction 11.2 6.5 11.4
40% Reduction 8.4 4.9 8.6
Nitrogen Levels Under Environmental Standards
To determine pre-policy safety levels within a region, each group's pre-policy 
safety levels are first averaged across risk aversion levels to estimate each group's safety 
level. Then, a weighted average of these group-level estimates is calculated, where the 
proportions of regional corn acreage in each group are used as weights. The CENNY 
and WESPLN regions have similar pre-policy safety levels of about 14 lbs/acre, which 
is almost twice as large as those in the EASPLT, region 8 lbs/acre (Table 12). This 
implies that the relative environmental standards studied in this section, if imposed 
uniformly on all three regions, will result in significantly higher absolute levels of 
environmental quality in EASPLT than in WESPLN and CENNY.
The maximum fertilization rates which meet the relative environmental 
standards in each region were determined by iterative comparisons of simulated 
distributions of leaching and runoff as described above. These "environmentally safe" 
fertilization rates are in Table 13. To accomplish a 20% reduction in nitrate loss, the 
allowable nitrogen levels for group 1 vary from 104 to 117 lbs/acre, and from 143 to 151 
lbs/acre for group 2. For the 40% standard, fertilization levels range from 78 to 101 
lbs/acre for group 1, and from 119 to 133 lbs/acre for group 2. For each environmental 
standard and all three regions, the environmentally safe nitrogen levels are smaller for
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group 1. From theoretical Proposition 4, this implies that if information is asymmetric, 
separate policies for the two groups will be optimal in every region.
Table 13. Environmentally Safe Nitrogen Levels, 
Relative Reductions in Nitrate Loss.
Env. Standard Nitrogen (lbs/acre)
Mean Net Returns 
(Standard Dev.)
(Safety Level) Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
CENNY Region
20% Reduction 
(11.2 lbs/acre)
117 143 $187.77
($109.39)
$120.48
($52.30)
40% Reduction 
(8.4 lbs/acre)
101 126 184.67
(110.24)
117.02
(50.92)
EASPLT Region
20% Reduction 
(6.5 lbs/acre)
104 146 169.63
(107.81)
134.62
(55.26)
40% Reduction 
(4.91bs/acre)
78 119 159.12
(108.92)
127.79
(52.60)
WESPLN Region
20% Reduction 
(11.4 lbs/acre)
106 151 175.51
(111.98)
134.44
(56.69)
40% Reduction 
(8.6 lbs/acre)
90 133 170.25
(112.95)
131.36
(54.88)
Optimal Payments
To study the program costs resulting from asymmetric information between 
producers and the government, optimal policies are calculated both under symmetric 
and under asymmetric information. If information is initially asymmetric, the 
difference in optimal payments between these two cases represents the decline in 
government cost from being able to classify individual farms. Thus, this difference is 
termed the “information premium;" it is the part of compensation payments strictly due
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to asymmetry of information. For policy purposes, the information premium would 
need to be weighed against the cost of collecting and/or using the information 
necessary to identify each farmer's group.
Symmetric Information: If information is symmetric, government compensation 
payments reflect the cost of foregone production income to improve environmental 
quality; payments for both groups are determined by equating the respective pre- and 
post-policy expected utility levels, where post-policy nitrogen application rates are set 
at the “environmentally safe" levels in Table 13. Table 14 shows the per-acre payments 
to meet the two environmental quality standards for both groups, and the average 
payments per acre in each region. Supposing the policy goal is a 20% reduction in 
nitrate loss, the payments range from $0.67 to $7.15 for group 1 and $0 to $1.37 for 
group 2. The next increment in improved environmental quality comes at a 
substantially greater cost; for a 40% reduction in nitrate loss, payments to group 1 range 
from $3.77 to $16.37 for group 1 and $1.13 to $8.20 for group 2. Because the reduction in 
nitrogen to meet environmental standards is generally larger for group 1, this group 
must receive greater compensation payments to restore pre-policy levels of expected 
utility. Average payments per acre are the largest in the EASPLT region; both groups 
suffer the largest reduction in net returns to meet the environmental quality standards 
in this region.
Asymmetric Information: In each of the three regions, the policy design under 
asymmetric information is analogous to the stylized example: group 2's yield is more 
responsive to nitrogen fertilizer at the margin than is group l 's  yield, optimal pre-policy 
fertilization rates are lower for group 1, and group 1 must also apply less nitrogen than 
group 2 to meet environmental quality standards. When these conditions hold, group 
2's optimal payment is determined by a binding participation constraint (pre- and post­
policy expected utility will be equal), and group l 's  payment is determined by a 
binding self-selection constraint (a farmer in group 1 will have the same expected utility 
under his own policy as he would under group 2's policy).
If information is asymmetric, payments include not only the cost of lost farm 
income, but also the information premium; Group 1 must receive an additional 
incentive to voluntarily select the appropriate policy, essentially giving these producers 
a windfall benefit because the government cannot identify which farmers belong to that 
group. The information premium ranges from $0 to $0.44 per acre for the 20%
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Table 14. Green Payments , Relative Reductions in Nitrate Loss.
Env.
Std.c
Risk
Param.
Symmetric Information Asymmetric Information
Info.
Premium 
(Group l)bGr. 1 Gr. 2 Avg.a Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Avg.a
CENNY Region
20% 0.00 $0.67 $1.18 $ 1.16 $0.85 $1.18 $1.17 $0.18
20% 0.01 1.23 0.67 0.69 1.46 0.67 0.70 0.23
20% 0.03 1.46 0.17 0.22 1.46 0.17 0.22 0.00
40% 0.00 3.77 4.63 4.60 8.37 4.63 4.78 4.60
40% 0.01 4.83 3.45 3.51 8.03 3.45 3.63 3.20
40% 0.03 5.24 1.94 2.07 6.82 1.94 2.14 1.58
EASPLT Region
20% 0.00 3.90 1.37 1.90 4.34 1.37 1.99 0.44
20% 0.01 4.92 0.68 1.57 5.18 0.68 1.63 0.26
20% 0.03 5.25 0.09 1.17 5.25 0.09 1.17 0.00
40% 0.00 14.42 8.20 9.51 21.76 8.20 11.05 7.34
40% 0.01 15.97 6.18 8.24 20.73 6.18 9.24 4.76
40% 0.03 16.37 3.62 6.30 18.35 3.62 6.71 1.98
WESPLN Region
20% 0.00 3.19 0.64 0.82 3.19 0.64 0.82 0.00
20% 0.01 4.66 0.18 0.49 4.66 0.18 0.49 0.00
20% 0.03 7.15 0.00 0.50 7.15 0.00 0.50 0.00
40% 0.00 8.44 3.72 4.05 12.15 3.72 4.31 3.71
40% 0.01 10.58 2.36 2.94 12.84 2.36 3.09 2.26
40% 0.03 14.24 1.13 2.05 14.69 1.13 2.08 0.45
a Weighted average payment per acre; weights are the proportion of acreage in 
each group (Table 8).
b Difference between payments under symmetric information and asymmetric 
information for group 1.
c Percentage reduction from pre-policy implied safety levels.
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standard14 and $0.45 to $7.34 per acre for the 40% standard (Table 14). A striking 
feature of these results is that the information premium increases as environmental 
standards become more stringent.
Average payments per acre generally decrease with the level of risk aversion 
because of the marginal risk effects of nitrogen. Since group 2 producers can meet 
environmental quality standards with smaller reductions in nitrogen as the risk 
aversion level increases, compensation to this group declines with the degree of risk 
aversion. Group Ts payments, which depend on the optimal policies for group 2, 
generally decrease with the level of risk aversion.
The estimated aggregate government cost to achieve environmental standards in 
each of the regions and the information premium are in Table 15. To put these 
aggregate costs in context, total government payments to all producers from existing 
government programs in 1992 are also reported. The largest aggregate costs are in the 
EASPLT region, even though this region is significantly smaller in terms of corn 
acreage. This results because average payments per acre are largest in this region and 
group 1, which receives larger payments than group 2, makes up a more significant 
share of corn acreage than in the other two regions. Even though the costs are highest 
in EASPLT, the relative environmental standards and pre-policy conditions imply that 
the absolute level of environmental quality is also the highest. Aggregate costs in all 
regions are substantially larger for the 40% standard than for the 20% standard. 
However, even for the more stringent standard, the aggregate cost of the “green" 
payment program is relatively small in comparison to total government payments in 
these regions.
The information premium varies substantially across regions. Like payment 
levels, the information premium is highest in the EASPLT region where group 1 makes 
up a large share of corn acreage compared to the other two regions. For all three
14A zero information premium arises when group 2's environmentally safe fertilization level is 
only slightly below optimal, and their compensation payment is relatively small (Tables 12 and 
13). From group l's  perspective, group 2's policy provides a small amount of compensation for 
nitrogen levels that are substantially supra-optimal (see Table 11). In such a case, group 1 
would prefer its pre-policy situation to group 2's policy. Therefore, group l's  payments are 
determined by a binding participation constraint, and are equivalent to the symmetric 
information case.
Table 15. Aggregate Cost of Relative Reductions in Environmental Damage.
Payments for 20% Standard3
___________________Payments for 40% Standard3________ Gov't
Land in Com Symmetric Information Asymmetric Information Info. Payments
Region Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Tot._____ Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Tot.______ Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Tot. Premium 1992b
— 1000 acres — --------------------------------------------- $1000-----------------------------------------------
CENNY 12 277 289 14 186 200 17 186 203 3 7050
56 957 1013 93 957 1050 37
EASPLT 26 98 124 128 67 195 135 67 202 7 3338
416 605 1021 540 605 1145 124
WESPLN 16 212 228 74 38 113 74 38 113 0 9124
169 500 669 205 500 705 36
a Based on per-acre payments for a risk aversion parameter of 0.01. 
b Based on the 1992 Census of Agriculture.
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regions, the aggregate information premium is higher for the 40% standard than for the 
20% standard; the costs imposed by asymmetric information are more of a concern as 
environmental standards become more stringent. If the program were implemented in 
these three regions, the overall cost of asymmetric information would be about $10,000 
for the 20% standard and about $200,000 for the 40% standard. This implies that 2% 
and 7% of program costs would be attributable to asymmetric information for the two 
standards, respectively. ^
Optimal Policies to Achieve Absolute Levels of Environmental Quality
In this section, the policy goal is to attain some uniform level of environmental 
quality across all regions, however large or small a reduction from initial levels this 
standard may impose. Here, the safety levels themselves define the policy objective. In 
particular, the two alternative environmental standards examined here require that 
nitrate losses fall below 10 and 7 lbs/acre with a 90% probability in all regions.
Nitrogen Levels Under Environmental Standards
The maximum fertilization rates which meet the 10 and 7 lbs/acre safety levels 
are in Table 16 for the three regions. The fertilization rates indicate significant spatial 
diversity in nitrate loss, even across contiguous regions in New York. For group 1, the 
absolute environmental standards are the most restrictive in the WESPLN region, 
where fertilization rates must be reduced to as little as 69 lbs/acre to meet the 7 lbs/acre 
chance constraint. Group 2, on the other hand, must bear the largest reduction in 
nitrogen application in the CENNY region, where environmentally safe levels are as 
low as 115 lbs/acre. The absolute environmental standards can be met most easily in 
the EASPLT region; even the pre-policy optimal fertilization rates would satisfy the 10 
lb chance constraint for both groups. The nitrogen levels in Table 16 are always smaller 
for group 1 than for group 2; here, two policies will also be optimal.
Optimal Payments
Table 17 provides optimal payments to achieve the absolute environmental 
standards. To meet the absolute environmental standards, not only does the average 
payment size differ across regions much more than the payments for relative standards, 
but so too do the loss in farm net returns, the information premium, the influence of risk 
aversion, and the distribution of payments between groups.
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Table 16. Environmentally Safe Nitrogen Levels, Absolute Nitrate Loss Safety Levels.
Safety Nitrogen (lbs/acre)
Mean Net Returns 
(Standard Dev.)
Level Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
CENNY Region
10 lbs/acre 110 136 $186.72
($109.79)
$119.33
($51.76)
7 lbs/acre 86 115 179.49
(110.86)
113.58
(49.90)
EASPLT Region3
10 lbs/acre — — — —
7 lbs/acre 110 — 171.11
(107.50)
—
WESPLN Region
10 lbs/acre 99 143 173.52
(112.42)
133.39
(55.92)
7 lbs/acre 69 121 159.20
(114.08)
127.89
(53.53)
a Except for group 1 and the 7 lbs/acre standard, the environmental quality standards 
are not applicable to this region; producers can meet the standards at pre-policy 
optimal fertilization rates.
Table 17. Green Payments, Absolute Nitrate Loss Standards.
Info.
Env.
Std.c
Risk Symmetric Information Asymmetric Information Premium 
(Group l)bParam. Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Avg.a Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Avg.a
CENNY Region
10 lb/a 0.00 $1.72 $2.32 $ 2.30 $3.79 $2.32 $ 2.38 $2.07
10 0.01 2.51 1.55 1.59 4.03 1.55 1.65 1.52
10 0.03 2.83 0.66 0.75 3.48 0.66 0.77 0.65
7 0.00 8.96 8.08 8.12 16.11 8.08 8.40 7.15
7 0.01 10.38 6.40 6.56 15.23 6.40 6.75 4.85
7 0.03 10.93 4.13 4.40 13.25 4.13 4.49 2.32
EASPLT Region
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 2.42 0.00 0.51 2.42 0.00 0.51 0.00
7 0.01 3.27 0.00 0.69 3.27 0.00 0.69 0.00
7 0.03 3.56 0.00 0.75 3.56 0.00 0.75 0.00
WESPLN Region
10 0.00 5.18 1.69 1.93 6.22 1.69 2.01 1.04
10 0.01 6.95 0.85 1.28 7.67 0.85 1.33 0.72
10 0.03 9.95 0.22 0.90 10.16 0.22 0.92 0.21
7 0.00 19.49 7.19 8.05 26.15 7.19 8.52 6.66
7 0.01 22.37 5.17 6.37 26.26 5.17 6.65 3.89
7 0.03 27.55 3.17 4.88 28.01 3.17 4.91 0.46
a Weighted average payment per acre; weights are the proportion of acreage in 
each group (Table 8).
b Difference between payments under symmetric information and asymmetric 
information for group 1. 
c Safety levels required by the program.
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Symmetric Information: As one might expect from the nitrogen levels in Table 
16, group 1 suffers the greatest loss in net returns in the WESPLN region; compensation 
payments range from $19.49 to $27.55 per acre. In comparison, the symmetric 
information payments to group 1 in the CENNY region range from $8.96 to $10.93 per 
acre. For group 2, the situation is reversed, but the cost of environmental improvement 
is much smaller in both regions; in WESPLN, the payments to group 2 range from $0.22 
to $1.69, compared with $0.66 to $2.32 in CENNY. In the EASPLT region, group 2 
producers need not reduce nitrogen to achieve either of the environmental standards, 
and group 1 producers will receive payments ranging from $2.42 to $3.56 only for the 7 
lbs/acre safety level.
Asymmetric information: Asymmetric information imposes additional costs on 
the program in WESPLN and CENNY. The information premium for the 10 lb standard 
ranges from $0.21 to $1.04 in WESPLN and from $0.65 to $2.07 in CENNY, while the 7 lb 
standard generates information premiums ranging from $0.46 to $6.66 in WESPLN and 
from $2.32 to $7.15 in CENNY. The value of information appears to be similar in both 
regions, but is slightly higher in CENNY. The EASPLT region has a zero information 
premium. In this region, only group l 's  policy is offered for the 7 lbs/acre standard, 
but this policy is still incentive compatible; the information premium is zero because 
group 2 has no incentive to volunteer for group l 's  policy.
The effect of risk aversion differs across the three regions. In the CENNY region, 
payments to both groups under asymmetric information are lowest for the most risk 
averse case. In contrast, payments in the EASPLT region (where only group l 's  policy 
is offered) increase with the risk aversion parameter. In the WESPLN region, risk 
aversion increases payments for group 1 and decreases payments for group 2. These 
changes in payments across regions demonstrate that the impact of risk aversion is 
difficult to generalize. Though it will always influence payments and should not be 
ignored, the direction and magnitude of its effects depend on the particular yield 
functions used and regional weather conditions. In our case, even with the same 
specification of yield functions across regions, differences in weather caused the effect 
of risk aversion to differ.
As in the case of relative standards, aggregate payments and information 
premiums differ across regions, but the pattern of payments is nearly reversed (Table 
18). While EASPLT generated the largest program cost under relative standards, the 
payments all but disappear when environmental standards are absolute; payments are
T a b le  18. Aggregate C o st of A b so lu te  R eductio ns in  E n viro n m e n tal Dam age.
Payments for 10 lb/acre Standard3
________________ Payments for 7 lb/acre Standard3_____  Gov't
Land in Corn*3 Symmetric Information Asymmetric Information Info. Payments
Region Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Tot._____ Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Tot.______ Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Tot. Premium 1992b
— 1000 acres — --------------------------------------------- $1000-----------------------------------------------
CENNY 12 277 289 29 430 459 47 430 477 18 7050
120 1776 1896 176 1776 1952 56
EASPLT 26 98 124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3338
85 0 85 85 0 85 0
WESPLN 16 212 228 111 180 291 122 180 303 11 9124
357 1096 1453 419 1096 1515 62
a Based on per-acre payments for a risk aversion parameter of 0.01. 
b Based on the 1992 Census of Agriculture.
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zero in EASPLT under the 10 lbs/acre standard, and are only 4% and 6% of the 
aggregate payments in CENNY and WESPLN, respectively, under the 7 lbs/acre 
standard. The value of information, totaled across the three regions, is $29,000 for the 
10 lbs/acre standard and $118,000 for the 7 lbs/acre standard. Under absolute 
standards, about 4% of program costs are attributable to asymmetric information.
Su m m ary and C o n clu sio n s
A number of important conclusions can be drawn from this region-level 
voluntary program to reduce nitrate loss from corn production under two alternative 
methods of defining environmental standards. Optimal payments differ substantially 
depending of the environmental standard regime chosen. In the EASPLT region, 
average payments per acre under the most stringent relative standards range from $7 to 
$11, versus a range of $2 to $5 per acre in CENNY and WESPLN. On the other hand, 
when absolute standards are imposed, the average payments in EASPLT are less than 
$1 per acre, versus $4 to $9 in CENNY and EASPLT. Thus, the distributional 
consequences of the government payments are sensitive to the type of environmental 
standard imposed. This is an additional dimension to the policy debate in designing 
such programs: even if the overall size of the program remains the same, the payments 
to each particular region would vary dramatically depending upon the standard regime 
chosen.
Even under the same set of environmental standards, optimal payments still 
vary substantially by region. For absolute standards, average payments to meet the 
same environmental standard (for the same risk aversion level) differ by as much as $8 
per acre between regions, and for relative standards this difference is as large as $13. 
These results are not entirely surprising; they support the notion that pollution levels 
differ between even relatively small geographic areas, indicating that the overall cost of 
such an environmental program could be significantly lowered by narrowing the 
regional focus of implementation. Of course, these cost savings would need to be 
weighed against the additional administrative costs from increased localization of the 
program.
The information premium, or program costs attributable to asymmetric 
information, vary depending on the stringency of environmental standards. As 
environmental standards become more strict, the information premium increases. If 
information is asymmetric and environmental standards are very stringent, not only
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will the cost of the program be large because farmers must dramatically reduce 
nitrogen, but also because the group identity of each producer is unknown. For large 
reductions in nitrogen, the government would benefit substantially from knowing 
which producers belong to which group. Nonetheless, in the New York case studied 
here, the aggregate information premium is not large in comparison to total program 
costs.
The information premium affects the outcome of the policy in at least two ways. 
First, at an aggregate level, higher information premiums directly influence the 
taxpayer cost of the program. If the aggregate cost of asymmetric information were 
large, it may be in the government's interest to collect (and/or use) the information 
necessary to implement the program under symmetric information. If the government 
so chooses, the information premium would disappear, but additional administrative 
costs would be incurred. As mentioned above, these costs savings do not appear to be 
significant in New York, but this may not be the case in the Midwest where leachable 
soils are more common.
Second, at the farm level, the size of the information premium per acre reflects 
the amount of windfall benefit one of the producer groups receives simply because the 
government cannot identify the producers in that group (in the case studied here, group 
1 receives the windfall benefit). Thus, there is a distributional consequence of 
asymmetric information; one group of farmers will necessarily benefit more than the 
other group because the government fails to identify them. Even if the aggregate cost 
savings alone did not warrant implementing the program under symmetric 
information, these distributional concerns may be presented as justification for doing 
so.
The overall effect of risk aversion is difficult to generalize. For the various 
scenarios of the New York model, the payments to group 1 generally increase with the 
level of risk aversion, and the payments to group 2 generally decrease. However, 
aggregate (or equivalently, average) payments decline with the level of risk aversion in 
some cases, but increase with risk aversion in others. Even though average payment 
levels exhibit no consistent pattern with respect to risk aversion, the information 
premium is always larger for risk neutrality than for risk aversion. Nonetheless, the 
results obtained here are likely to be sensitive to the particular specification and data 
used. While risk aversion affects the outcome of the model, both qualitatively and
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quantitatively, its impact is largely an empirical question which must be addressed in 
each region.
P O L IC Y  IM P L IC A T IO N S
The purpose of this research is to develop a model of a voluntary "green" 
payment program to limit nitrate leaching and runoff from corn production in New 
York. At a conceptual level, the model can be modified or extended in obvious ways to 
consider any production practice which generates reductions in nitrate contamination 
or other environmental benefits; in this case, the application is to voluntary reductions 
in nitrogen fertilizer application rates.
The program allows environmental goals to be achieved through self-interested 
choices of farmers. These choices and program payments can differ by productivity 
and environmental vulnerability of the soils. The model allows for asymmetric 
information between farmers and the government, explicitly considering the stochastic 
nature of prices, agricultural production, and environmental damage. Farmers are 
assumed to maximize expected utility, and the government's environmental quality 
goals are articulated as chance constraints on severe levels of nitrate leaching and 
runoff.
Based on the theoretical analysis, separate policies are necessary if the group 
whose soils are more productive at the margin to changes in nitrogen also generate less 
nitrate contamination at the margin. These separate policies would avoid the 
inefficiencies in conventional uniform taxes and quantity restrictions that fail to 
recognize differences in resource endowments across farms. When government officials 
have sufficient information about soils to assign farmers to payment groups (symmetric 
information), environmental standards can be met exactly at minimum cost. If 
information is asymmetric, then policy makers cannot assign farmers to groups, and the 
group which is more susceptible to nitrate loss must be compensated by more than their 
loss in net returns for participation to be voluntary. This windfall to this group is an 
additional cost to society which must be balanced against the administrative cost of 
collecting information about differences in soils by farm.
This model was applied empirically to three New York farming regions, where 
farmers were divided into two groups on the basis of soil type. Based on estimated 
yield and environmental damage functions, optimal "green" payments were 
determined to meet two types of environmental standards: relative (20 and 40%)
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reductions from pre-policy levels of nitrate loss in each region, and absolute standards 
of 7 and 10 lbs of nitrate loss per acre. Required reductions in nitrogen rates would 
insure that these standards are exceeded with a probability of less than 10%.
From the empirical analysis, optimal payments would differ significantly by 
environmental standard, region, group, and risk aversion level. When relative 
reductions are imposed, payments were largest in the region where crop yields and 
existing levels of nitrate contamination were both lowest. Across all regions, payments 
ranged from less than $1 to as high as $22 per acre, representing up to 13% of pre-policy 
net return. The windfall benefit resulting from asymmetric information ranged from $0 
to $7 per acre and increased with the stringency of environmental standards. 
Reductions in nitrogen were between 0 and 60 lbs per acre, representing as much as a 
43% decline from initial levels for the most stringent standard.
Under absolute standards, the pattern of payments across regions would change 
dramatically. When an absolute level of environmental quality is sought, the reductions 
in fertilizer and concomitant payments are highest in the regions most susceptible to 
environmental damage. The region with the lowest pre-policy levels of contamination 
would have essentially no program at all (estimated average payments per acre were 
less than $1), while the payments in the other regions ranged from $1 to $28 per acre, or 
up to 16% of initial net returns. The cost of information does not appear to be sensitive 
to the type of environmental standard; estimated windfall benefits were between $0 and 
$7, falling within the same range as for relative standards. The absolute standards 
would require decreases in nitrogen fertilizer between 0 and 76 lbs per acre, or up to a 
52% reduction from pre-policy levels.
Risk aversion significantly complicates the policy design problem, and its impact 
is difficult to generalize because nitrogen is a risk reducing input for farmers with the 
highest yielding soil and slightly risk increasing for the other group. If, in 
implementing this program, the government incorrectly assesses producers' risk 
attitudes, we cannot say a priori whether total program payments needed to satisfy 
farmers' self-selection conditions are over- or under-estimated.
At an aggregate level, there are an estimated 641,000 acres of corn in these three 
regions. If one assumes complete participation, the estimated program payments 
would range from $0.5 million to $3.5 million over the regions combined, depending on 
the stringency of environmental standards. Even under these high participation rates,
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this program is not terribly expensive, representing only 3% to and 18% of total 
government payments received by farmers in the three regions in 1992. Further, the 
cost of asymmetric information represents only 10% of total program outlays. In New 
York, where the agricultural use value assessment program already requires that local 
agricultural offices have the capacity to place farmland into ten soil productivity groups 
(Thomas and Boisvert, 1995), much of this cost might be avoided.
Although this research has articulated several advantages of this type of policy, 
the main disadvantage of a "green" payment scheme is that improvements in 
environmental quality rely on the voluntary participation of farmers. One could hardly 
expect anywhere close to 100% participation for these large regions, especially in light 
of the relatively small payment levels in some regions and the substantial required 
reductions in nitrogen fertilizer application rates. The situation could be quite different 
if the program were designed around another kind of management practice or if the 
program targeted localized areas with extremely vulnerable soils. In a stylized example 
of targeting soils for reductions in nitrogen application rates, estimated payments were 
substantially higher; payments to the most leachable group ranged from $7 to $37, and 
payments to the second group ranged from $2 to $25. But even in this case, there is a 
need for additional research to better understand the factors that influence voluntary 
farmer participation. Further, if the programs are to target soils effectively, more 
research is needed to identify soil characteristics which more sharply isolate the 
vulnerable soils, and to refine the nitrogen yield response functions particularly in 
terms of the effect on risk. Finally, the administrative procedures and costs of 
implementing voluntary programs would need to be investigated thoroughly.
65
A p p e n d ix  A : Proofs o f the P rop o sitions
Proof o f  Proposi tion 1:
To show property (a), we must verify that the Hessian matrix of the function ul is 
negative definite. That is, we must have
u ‘NN < 0, u's s <0, and
U NN U NS
uSN uss
— uNNuss uSNuNS > 0 , i — 1,2.
where, u ‘SNis the second order cross-partial derivative of u ' with respect to S and N, and 
other terms defined analogously. Using the definition of w' from equation (2-4), the first 
derivatives with respect to N and S are
1 T
K  = ^ 2 > ; W M )  + S,)R;n(N,), and
1 t=l 
1 T 
1 t=i
where R‘tN is the first derivative of Rlt with respect to N. The second derivatives are
1 T
« ™ = ^ Z f « .W W ) + s , ) [ R ;„ ( N jr + «;(R;(N 1) + s,)R;m (N,)},
1 f=l
n « = ^ S « ,'(R ;'(N l)+ s ,) ,
1 f = l
1 7
« * = « ;  = T E « ( N , ) + s , A ( N i),
1 t=i
where R‘tNN is the second derivative of R't with respect to N. In the expression for 
u ^ T h e  first term in the sum is negative because u"< 0 and the second term is also 
negative since u’ is positive and R‘tNN is negative (R ‘lNN = < 0 ). Thus u‘NN <0,
and ulss is also explicitly negative. To check the remaining condition 
u'NNu'ss -  u'SNu'NS > 0 , we must determine the sign of
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(12) 2 Z{M«[^ n] + U 't R>NN } Z U 'it y2 Z U it R t f! Z U U^>N ' '
1 (=1 (=1 T  (=1 t=l
where w't represents the derivative of w evaluated at (Rh +S;). This expression can be 
rewritten
1  I T T T T T T
l £  £ u'iK [R>N]2 + Z Z W A n -  Z Z K K ^ nKsN
t=1 s=l f= l S=1 f= l  f= l
The first sum is positive since u”< 0 , u\ > 0  and R'NN < 0. The second sum can be 
separated into terms where t=s and where tes. The terms where t-s  will equal zero 
since [R'tN - R'sn]=0. For the remaining terms, note that any two years htl will appear in 
the sum exactly twice. That is,
Z Z u»UA [<■ - RiN] = ■•■+« R i N[RL -R\n] + -
f= l s * t  .
■ ■ ■+u”ku"R]N [R‘IN -  R'kN ]+• - •
Combining these two terms,
Z Z u " < r ',n [ r ,n - r 'sn ] = ■ • - + « [ R L  ( K n -  r ‘,n ) - r ',n ( K n - r ;n )]+• • 
= - + « X ( ^ - < ) 2+ -> o ,
since u"< 0. Since each pairwise combination of terms is strictly positive, their sum 
must also be positive. This establishes that (12) > 0, which completes the proof of 
property (a).
To prove property (b), take the expectation of u' from its definition in equation 
to obtain
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1 T
= - S E [ " , ( R ' W ^ l, P„r,) + S,)].
1 t=1
Since the sample observations {(Wi/pi,n)/...,(WT,pT,rT)} will be identically and 
independently distributed, this becomes
T-E[ul(Rt(Nl,W ,p ,r) + S,)]
= E[ui(Ri(Ni,W ,p ,r) + Si)].
Proof o f Proposition 2:
, dy2(N,W ) dy\N,WJ)
Suppose that -----— ----- > ------— ----- . Multiplying both sides of this inequality by pt
and subtracting rt from both sides, we have
dy2(N,W t)
Pt ' m  — r>>v>
dy\ N ,w t)
~ r,'dN f r ' dN 
which means that, for any N, R2tN - R*tN >0. Summing across years we have
T T T T
Z  - Z  K  > 0,  and £ Z  R,2N - X Z  R,'n > 0.
f= 1 f= l s = l ( = 1 s = l  f = l
Interchanging the roles of s and t in the first sum, and reversing the order of 
summation, this can be equivalently stated
T T T T T T
ZZr?n-ZZk.~>o «  Z Z ft-4 i>».
(=1 s= l f= l s= l f= l s= l
This implies the desired result that
Z 2>.W + S)“!(R,J+s>[r;„ - r;n] > o,
f = l  S=1
since u' >  0.
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A p p e n d ix  B:
Table B-l. Corn Silage Prices, 1963-1992.
Year
Corn
Grain
Price
($/bu)ab
Corn
Grain
Yield
(bu/a)b
Corn
Silage
Yield
(tons/a)b
Imputed
Corn
Silage
Price
($/ton)
Index of 
Prices 
Rec'd by 
Farmers 
(1977=100)c
Real 
Corn 
Silage 
Price 
(1992 $/t)
1963 1.26d 62.0 12.0 6.52 53 17.22
1964 1.34 64.0 11.0 7.80 52 20.99
1965 1.34 61.0 12.0 6.81 54 17.66
1966 1.43 75.0 12.5 8.58 58 20.71
1967 1.17 87.0 15.5 6.57 55 16.72
1968 1.18 80.0 12.5 7.55 56 18.88
1969 1.34 85.0 14.0 8.14 59 19.31
1970 1.47 88.0 14.0 9.24 60 21.56
1971 1.20 87.0 14.0 7.46 62 16.84
1972 1.71 70.0 10.5 11.40 69 23.13
1973 2.76 77.0 12.5 17.00 98 24.29
1974 3.03 80.0 13.0 18.65 105 24.86
1975 2.57 87.0 13.5 16.56 101 22.96
1976 2.42 81.0 12.0 16.34 102 22.42
1977 2.20 87.0 13.5 14.18 100 19.85
1978 2.44 86.0 13.5 15.54 115 18.92
1979 2.75 92.0 13.5 18.74 132 19.88
1980 3.50 93.0 14.5 22.45 134 23.45
1981 2.66 93.0 14.5 17.06 139 17.18
1982 2.95 92.0 13.5 20.10 133 21.16
1983 3.54 90.0 13.5 23.60 135 24.47
1984 2.85 91.0 13.5 19.21 142 18.94
1985 2.45 95.0 14.0 16.63 128 18.18
1986 1.76 99.0 14.0 12.45 123 14.17
1987 2.20 109.0 15.0 15.99 127 17.62
1988 2.83 85.0 13.0 18.50 138 18.77
1989 2.80 93.0 13.0 20.03 147 19.08
1990 2.44 98.0 15.0 15.94 149 14.98
1991 2.70 98.0 14.0 18.90 145 18.25
1992 2.30 92.0 14.5 14.59 140 14.59
a Season average.
b Source: New York Agricultural Statistics, various issues.
c Source: USD A Agricultural Statistics, various issues.
d In 1963, New York corn price data were unavailable. The reported price is 
the national corn price in 1963, $1.11 (Agricultural Statistics) times the 
average ratio of New York to national corn prices from 1964-1968,1.136.
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Table B-2. Nitrogen Fertilizer Prices, 1963-1992.
Year
Urea 
Price 
($/ ton)a
Urea 
Price 
($/lb N)b
Index of 
Priced 
Paid by 
Farmers 
(1977=100)c
Imputed
Real
Urea
Price
(1992$/lb N)
1963 114.09d 0.13 47 0.47
1964 110.00 0.12 47 0.44
1965 110.00 0.12 48 0.44
1966 110.00 0.12 50 0.42
1967 105.00 0.12 50 0.40
1968 100.00 0.11 50 0.38
1969 86.50 0.10 52 0.32
1970 85.00 0.09 54 0.30
1971 86.00 0.10 57 0.29
1972 86.50 0.10 61 0.27
1973 96.00 0.11 73 0.25
1974 215.00 0.24 83 0.49
1975 230.00 0.26 91 0.48
1976 180.00 0.20 97 0.35
1977 180.00 0.20 100 0.34
1978 189.00 0.21 108 0.33
1979 213.00 0.24 125 0.32
1980 259.00 0.29 138 0.36
1981 275.00 0.31 148 0.35
1982 278.00 0.31 153 0.35
1983 249.00 0.28 152 0.31
1984 250.00 0.28 155 0.31
1985 238.00 0.26 151 0.30
1986 200.00 0.22 144 0.26
1987 190.00 0.21 148 0.24
1988 208.00 0.23 157 0.25
1989 227.00 0.25 165 0.26
1990 215.00 0.24 171 0.24
1991 243.00 0.27 173 0.27
1992 221.00 0.25 174 0.24
a Source: New York Agricultural Statistics, various issues. 
b Assumes that 1 ton of urea contains 900 lbs of nitrogen (45%). 
c Source: USD A A gricultural S tatistics, various issues.
d In 1963, New York urea price data were unavailable. The reported price is 
the national urea price in 1963, $107 (Agricultural S tatistics) times the 
average ratio of New York to national urea prices from 1964-1968,1.066.
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T a b le  B -3 . V a ria b le  P ro d uctio n  Costs for C o rn  S ila g e , 1992a
Item Units
Appl. 
Rate per 
Acre
Cost 
per Unit 
(1992 $)
Cost 
per Acre 
(1992 $)
Lime tons 0.5 29.07 14.53
Herbicide gallons 0.6 25.14 15.09
Insecticide gallons 0.4 20.12 8.05
Soil Testing 1 0.75 0.75
Fuel gallons 10.56 1.00 10.51
Lubrication 1 1.01 1.01
Repair and Maintenance 1 27.16 27.16
Manure Application tons 20 1.33 26.55
Seed 1000 kernels 25 0.90 22.44
Phosphorous lb. P205 40 0.23 9.12
Potassium lb. K20 50 0.12 6.20
Hired Labor 5.56 6.03 33.55
Custom Operations 1.00 5.83 5.83
Other 1.00 2.51 2.51
Operating Interest 183.31 0.12 6.20
Total 189.52
Sources: Schmit (1994) and USDA-ERS, Econom ic Indicators o f  the Farm S ecto r : 
Field Crops and D airy (1992). 
a Excluding nitrogen fertilizer cost.
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Table B-4. Weather Variables at the Ithaca Weather Station, 1963 -1992.
Growing Acccum. Total Rain w /in Rain w /in Rain w /in
Season Growing Annual 14 days of 14 days of 14 days of
Rainfall Degree Rainfall Planting Fertilizer Harvest
Year (w , r b Days {W 2 ) (RAIN)b (PRSTRM)b (FRSTRM)b (HRSTRM)b
1963 17.50 1802.5 30.12 0.54 1.55 0.00
1964 16.46 2115.0 30.78 0.01 1.41 0.00
1965 14.17 2046.0 32.86 0.01 0.01 0.00
1966 17.38 2027.0 37.48 0.01 0.85 0.85
1967 22.88 1980.5 38.91 0.69 0.58 0.58
1968 18.97 2043.0 42.44 0.56 1.31 0.00
1969 14.90 2073.0 37.87 0.91 3.26 0.97
1970 19.38 2072.5 46.33 1.60 2.37 2.18
1971 16.00 1970.0 35.75 0.65 0.01 1.37
1972 27.35 1920.0 51.62 0.01 6.46 1.34
1973 20.41 2143.5 38.87 0.56 0.51 0.86
1974 20.77 1920.5 42.71 1.12 1.71 2.15
1975 25.82 2130.5 45.90 0.60 0.01 5.18
1976 27.06 1841.5 48.71 1.64 2.42 0.86
1977 26.52 2049.5 47.81 0.01 2.10 9.53
1978 15.03 1998.5 36.38 0.01 0.01 1.67
1979 19.25 1949.0 39.80 1.74 0.94 0.79
1980 17.47 2123.0 34,88 0.01 1.48 0.59
1981 21.19 2018.0 41.39 0.97 0.70 2.36
1982 20.01 1906.0 32.39 1.26 1.65 1.43
1983 18.80 2113.5 33.66 0.01 0.78 1.27
1984 26.51 1912.0 41.68 2.97 1.13 2.67
1985 17.67 1880.0 37.61 1.42 1.23 0.00
1986 21.75 1997.0 39.72 2.43 0.73 0.76
1987 21.19 2182.5 33.94 0.01 0.64 1.60
1988 17.33 2132.0 34.38 1.04 0.01 1.12
1989 24.91 2102.5 40.16 0.01 0.51 4.03
1990 22.31 2027.5 40.47 1.20 0.67 1.09
1991 16.18 2367.0 36.83 0.88 0.01 1.90
1992 25.44 1816.0 40.82 0.01 0.01 2.06
Mean 20.35 2021.98 39.08 0.76 1.17 1.64
Std. Dev. 3.900 118.978 5.250 0.77 1.28 1.85
Maximum 27.35 2367.00 51.62 2.97 6.46 9.53
Minimum 14.17 1802.50 30.12 0.01 0.01 0.00
Cov(W, , W 2) -138.72
Source: Northeast Regional Climate Center.
a This rainfall variable is total rainfall from April 1 to Septermber 30. 
b In inches per year.
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Table B-5. Weather Variables for the EASPLT Region, 1963 -1992.
Growing Acccum. Total Rain w /in Rain w /in Rain w /in
Season Growing Annual 14 days of 14 days of 14 days of
Rainfall Degree Rainfall Planting Fertilizer Harvest
Year (w 1r b Days (W2) (RAIN)b (PRSTRM)b (FRSTRM)b (HRSTRM)b
1963 17.50 1802.5 30.85 0.01 0.01 0.00
1964 16.46 2115.0 32.74 1.18 0.54 0.54
1965 13.11 2108.0 33.59 0.01 0.01 0.00
1966 17.11 2046.5 39.34 0.01 0.58 0.58
1967 21.52 1936.5 46.99 0.01 1.55 1.55
1968 22.72 2020.0 32.03 3.05 3.58 3.58
1969 15.90 2061.5 44.24 1.59 3.32 3.32
1970 18.24 2173.5 44.09 2.21 1.09 1.09
1971 15.03 2076.5 37.85 0.01 3.36 3.36
1972 24.67 2033.5 45.44 0.01 6.59 6.59
1973 22.14 2226.5 38.96 0.97 0.59 0.59
1974 17.24 1881.5 17.39 0.01 0.01 0.00
1975 27.49 2146.5 11.47 0.01 0.01 0.00
1976 19.53 1776.0 48.81 2.10 1.05 1.05
1977 24.52 1922.0 51.36 0.62 1.02 1.02
1978 17.57 2085.5 35.97 1.56 0.01 0.00
1979 18.01 2019.5 44.89 0.55 0.62 0.62
1980 13.64 2330.5 38.21 0.01 2.03 2.03
1981 17.43 2104.0 41.58 0.01 3.10 3.10
1982 17.81 2043.0 36.04 0.01 0.78 0.78
1983 19.57 2213.5 37.08 0.01 1.21 1.21
1984 28.40 1981.0 44.46 3.16 3.48 3.48
1985 16.28 1910.0 46.11 1.10 0.73 0.73
1986 17.82 2319.0 40.89 2.97 1.22 1.22
1987 20.52 2499.0 38.97 0.66 2.76 2.76
1988 19.42 2514.0 19.95 0.01 0.01 0.00
1989 19.40 2360.5 41.78 1.33 3.70 3.70
1990 19.56 2217.0 43.51 1.96 0.01 0.00
1991 11.70 2681.5 37.15 1.12 0.01 0.00
1992 26.25 1987.5 53.71 0.55 0.01 0.00
Mean 19.22 2119.72 38.52 0.89 1.43 1.43
Std. Dev. 4.006 205.320 9.25 1.00 1.58 1.59
Maximum 28.40 2681.50 53.71 3.16 6.59 6.59
Minimum 11.70 1776.00 11.47 0.01 0.01 0.00
Source: Northeast Regional Climate Center, Elmira weather station. 
a This rainfall variable is total rainfall from April 1 to September 30. 
b In inches per year.
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Table B-6. Weather Variables for the WESPLN Region, 1963 -1992.
Growing Acccum. Total Rain w /in Rain w /in Rain w /in
Season Growing Annual 14 days of 14 days of 14 days of
Rainfall Degree Rainfall Planting Fertilizer Harvest
Year (w 1r b Days (W2 )c (RAIN)b (PRSTRM)b (FRSTRM)b (HRSTRM)b
1963 14.56 1802.5 30.85 0.01 0.01 0.00
1964 15.32 2115.0 32.74 1.18 0.54 0.54
1965 14.19 2108.0 33.59 0.01 0.01 0.00
1966 16.69 2046.5 39.34 0.01 0.58 0.58
1967 18.76 1936.5 46.99 0.01 1.55 1.55
1968 16.35 2020.0 32.03 3.05 3.58 3.58
1969 23.06 2061.5 44.24 1.59 3.32 3.32
1970 24.38 2173.5 44.09 2.21 1.09 1.09
1971 14.95 2076.5 37.85 0.01 3.36 3.36
1972 20.21 2033.5 45.44 0.01 6.59 6.59
1973 19.74 2226.5 38.96 0.97 0.59 0.59
1974 17.81 1881.5 17.39 0.01 0.01 0.00
1975 21.78 2146.5 11.47 0.01 0.01 0.00
1976 23.14 1776.0 48.81 2.10 1.05 1.05
1977 32.34 1922.0 51.36 0.62 1.02 1.02
1978 16.19 2085.5 35.97 1.56 0.01 0.00
1979 16.40 2019.5 44.89 0.55 0.62 0.62
1980 16.19 2330.5 38.21 0.01 2.03 2.03
1981 26.22 2104.0 41.58 0.01 3.10 3.10
1982 17.75 2043.0 36.04 0.01 0.78 0.78
1983 17.35 2213.5 37.08 0.01 1.21 1.21
1984 25.57 1981.0 44.46 3.16 3.48 3.48
1985 11.50 1910.0 46.11 1.10 0.73 0.73
1986 22.17 2319.0 40.89 2.97 1.22 1.22
1987 22.89 2499.0 38.97 0.66 2.76 2.76
1988 16.43 2514.0 19.95 0.01 0.01 0.00
1989 24.76 2360.5 41.78 1.33 3.70 3.70
1990 20.96 2217.0 43.51 1.96 0.01 0.00
1991 14.87 2681.5 37.15 1.12 0.01 0.00
1992 23.28 1987.5 53.71 0.55 0.01 0.00
Mean 19.53 2119.72 38.52 0.89 1.43 1.43
Std. Dev. 4.513 205.320 9.25 1.00 1.58 1.59
Maximum 32.34 2681.50 53.71 3.16 6.59 6.59
Minimum 11.50 1776.00 11.47 0.01 0.01 0.00
Source: Northeast Regional Climate Center, Portageville weather station. 
a This rainfall variable is total rainfall from April 1 to September 30. 
b In inches per year.
c From the Elmira weather station, since temperatures are not recorded at Portageville.
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A p p e n d ix  C : P o lic y  D e sig n  W ith  U n sp e cifie d  U t ility  Fun ctio ns
This appendix presents an alternative formulation of the empirical policy design 
model. Rather than specifying a utility function for the two groups of farmers, the 
model assumes only that the functions u, are increasing and strictly concave. These 
assumptions are equivalent to farmers preferring more income to less and being risk 
averse, and the policy design problem may be formulated in terms of second-degree 
stochastic dominance (SSD) (Hadar and Russell, 1969).
The SSD criterion compares the entire distributions of uncertain alternatives.15 
Assuming that (» ;>  o and u”< 0), if the distribution F dominates G in terms of second- 
degree stochastic dominance, then the expected utility of alternative F is higher than the 
expected utility of G (Hadar and Russell, 1969). SSD conditions correspond to risk 
aversion coefficients anywhere in the interval [0,co). If payment levels are chosen so that 
post-policy distributions of net returns for both groups are preferred in terms of SSD, 
we are guaranteed that every risk averse decision maker will choose the correct policy.
T h e  M o d el
In formulating the model using SSD, the constraints involve the cumulative 
distribution function (c.d.f.) of income for both groups, F^R' + S\ N ) , where the random
variable R‘ + S (i.e., the sum of random net returns and fixed government payments) is 
income, which is conditioned on the nitrogen level N. The model becomes:
min A S, +A ,S,
(NlrN2^ , S 2) 1 1
subject to N, < N* (E,)
F,(R2 + Sa | N j) SSD Fa (R1 + 0| N°) (Pi)
F2(R2 + S2|N2) SSD F2(R2 + 0|N2°) (Pi )
F,(Rl -i-S^N,) SSD Fx(R2+S2\N2) (h)
15For two cumulative distribution functions, F and G, the alternative F dominates G if the area 
under F is nowhere more than that of G, and somewhere less than the area under G.
t y > 0 , S f > 0 ,
where A, is the number of acres in group i. (Ei) are environmental quality constraints, 
and constraints (Pi) require that the post-policy distributions of net returns dominate 
the respective pre-policy distributions, ensuring that farmers in both groups have an 
incentive to participate in the program. The self-selection conditions (Ii) require that the 
distribution of net returns, if each group chooses its own policy, will dominate the net 
return distributions had the other group's policy been chosen. Because this formulation 
of the model involves the conditions for SSD, it cannot be solved analytically, and its 
properties are difficult to derive. Thus, we will explore its properties through empirical 
results.
A n  E m p iric a l A p p lic a tio n
The model in this appendix is applied to the stylized empirical example above, 
which was for central New York. Observations from the Ithaca weather station define 
the 30-year distribution of weather variables (Table 7), and soil characteristics for each 
group are determined by a simple average of two representative soils in each group 
(Table 9). The maximum nitrogen fertilization levels which meet the environmental 
quality standards (20,0.1), (30,0.1), and (40,0.1) for these representative soils are in Table 
10. Using these "environmentally safe" fertilization rates, optimal policies are 
determined under both the assumption of symmetric and asymmetric information.
Before the optimal policies can be calculated, we must determine the pre-policy 
fertilization rates for the two groups. Since farmers' utility functions are not specified 
in the SSD formulation, these nitrogen levels cannot be derived from the maximization 
of a function. Rather, entire distributions arising from alternative levels of nitrogen 
must be compared in an iterative fashion. In particular, candidates for optimal pre­
policy fertilization levels are those in the second-degree stochastic efficient (SSE) set, which 
are the nitrogen application rates generating distributions of net returns that are not 
dominated by any other distribution. For the two groups, the SSE fertilization rates
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were determined using a program in Anderson et al. (1977); it seemed reasonable to set 
the pre-policy fertilization levels at the midpoint of the SSE ranges. The SSE ranges and 
midpoints are reported, along with the associated means and standard deviations in net 
returns, in Table C -l. The fertilization rates fall within the range of optimal rates that 
result from maximizing expected utility in the stylized examples above.
T a b le  C - l .  O p tim a l P re -P o licy  N itro g en  Levels.
SSE
Net Returns at 
SSE Midpoint
Group
Range 
(lb/ acre)
Midpoint 
(lb/acre)3
Standard
Mean Deviation
1 129-138 133 $188.35 $108.35
2 142-160 151 $121.31 $52.87
a Theses nitrogen levels are N,° in the model.
The Policies
For comparison with the above results, optimal policies are determined under 
both the assumptions of symmetric and asymmetric information. We first describe the 
procedures used to calculate policies for each situation, then compare the results 
obtained here to those in the text, and highlight the implications of this comparison.
Symmetric Information: If information is symmetric between farmers and the 
government, the constraints (E,) and (Pi) will bind for i=1,2. At the optimal policies, 
nitrogen levels will be exactly N *, and compensation payments S- will be set so that the 
distribution of net returns under (Nj rS{) just dominates the pre-policy distribution from 
nitrogen level N,°. That is, constraints (Pi) must hold at the optimal policies, but 
government payments are not minimized unless S, are the smallest payments that 
satisfy the constraints; a small reduction in the optimal payment S, would violate the 
participation condition.
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The optimal policies were calculated by an iterative method, using the program 
in Anderson et al. (1977). In this iterative search, post-policy nitrogen levels were fixed
at N*, and the compensation payment S, was varied (in increments of $0.25) to 
determine the minimum payment that satisfies the participation constraint. At the 
optimal policy (N ^ S J, the distribution of net returns dominates the pre-policy 
distribution, but if compensation payments are reduced to S' = S, -  0.25, the post-policy 
distribution would no longer dominate (Table C-2).16 The third and fourth columns of 
Table C-2 contain the optimal payments under symmetric information.
Table C-2. Optimal Green Payments.
Safety
Level
( n
Risk
Aversion
Parameter
{a)
Symmetric
Information Asymmetric Information
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Difference
40 0.00 4.34 4.11 8.44 4.11 4.33
40 0.01 5.45 3.01 8.33 3.01 5.32
40 0.03 5.88 1.63 7.29 1.63 5.66
40 SSD 6.75 3.77 10.25 3.77 6.48
30 0.00 9.82 10.36 18.27 10.36 7.91
30 0.01 11.28 8.40 16.94 8.40 8.54
30 0.03 11.84 5.67 14.45 5.67 8.78
30 SSD 13.00 10.02 20.00 10.02 9.98
20 0.00 23.57 25.39 37.32 25.39 11.93
20 0.01 25.39 21.88 34.09 21.88 12.21
20 0.03 26.27 16.62 29.11 16.62 12.49
20 SSD 27.75 25.05 38.50 25.05 13.45
16For group 2 producers, optimal payments were directly calculated using the properties of the 
net return distributions. In particular, for S2 to be optimal, it is necessary and sufficient that
S2 = E[R2(N2)] -  E[R2(N2)] . To see this, first note that the mean of the post policy distribution 
must be no less than the mean of the pre-policy distribution, if the SSD condition is to be 
satisfied (Anderson et al., 1977). For sufficiency, recall that nitrogen is a risk increasing input for 
group 2 and that post-policy nitrogen levels are lower than the initial levels. These two facts 
imply that the variance in post-policy net returns will be lower than the variance in pre-policy 
returns. If S2 is set so that the mean of both distributions are equal, then the post- policy 
distribution is a mean-preserving shrink of the pre-policy distribution and will dominate by SSD 
(Mas-Collel et al., 1995).
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Asymmetric Information: For this particular example, the nitrogen levels that 
meet environmental quality standards indicate, by theoretical Propositions 3 and 4, that 
two separate policies are optimal under asymmetric information. Furthermore, the 
propositions imply that these optimal policies satisfy the constraints (Ei), (It), (Ei), and 
(P2) with equality. As in the symmetric information case, post-policy nitrogen levels are 
set at the environmentally safe levels N*. In this case, however, the compensation
payments S1 and S2 must satisfy a different set of conditions. Compensation levels to 
both groups must be the smallest payments such that: (1) the distribution of net returns 
for group 1 producers, under its own policy, dominates the distribution if group 2's 
policy is chosen (constraint (It)); and (2) group 2 producers' post-policy distribution 
dominates their own pre-policy distribution (constraint (P2)).
Like the symmetric information payments, optimal payment levels were 
determined by iteratively comparing distributions of net returns, where each alternative 
post-policy distribution corresponds to a unique government payment. Unlike the 
previous case, however, payments to the groups cannot be determined independently, 
since group l 's  payment depends on the payment to group 2. Thus, payments for the 
two groups were calculated recursively: group 2's optimal payment was determined 
first (since it does not depend on group l 's  payment), and group l 's  payment was 
calculated based on the result. Note that the "asymmetric information payments" to 
group 2, S2, are equal to the "symmetric information payments", S2, since they satisfy 
exactly the same constraints. Group l 's  payments were determined by comparing the 
distributions under the policy (N2,S2) and (N ^ S j) , where S1 was iteratively varied.
The optimal payments under asymmetric information are in Table C-2, both for 
the SSD model used here and the expected utility model developed in the text. It 
should be noted that the optimal polices reported for the SSD model in Table C-2 are 
not, strictly speaking, solutions to the policy design problem. Under the reported 
policies, the distribution of net returns for group 2 does not dominate their net return 
distribution if group l 's  policy is chosen. This implies that some risk averse producers
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in group 2 may choose group l 's  policy over their own policy.17 If this is the case, the 
environmental quality standards would still not be violated, since group l 's  policy 
corresponds to a lower level of nitrogen than group 2's policy. Nonetheless, if a 
significant proportion of group 2 producers "defect" to the higher paying policy, the 
impact on program costs could be substantial.
In comparing the payments in Table C-2 to those obtained from the expected 
utility model, we observe essentially no change in the qualitative results. The 
"symmetric information payments" are quite similar across groups, and group 1 
producers benefit substantially if information is asymmetric. Quantitatively, the 
payments to group 2 lie within the range of payments in the expected utility model, as 
the risk aversion parameter is varied at each safety level. Group l 's  optimal payments 
are somewhat larger in the SSD model than in the expected utility model, uniformly 
about $1.75 higher than the risk neutral case under asymmetric information.
17While group 2's own policy does not dominate group l's  policy, nor does group l 's  policy 
dominate group 2's own policy; the SSD ranking is simply inconclusive for these two 
distributions. The fact that these alternatives cannot be distinguished by SSD means that some 
group 2 farmers will choose their own policy, and some will select the one designed for group 
1.
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A p p e n d ix  D : D eco m p o sitio n  of N et R eturn R is k
Both yield risk due to uncertain weather conditions, and price risk due to the 
randomness in prices are important components of the policy design model. This 
appendix examines the relative importance of these two sources of risk and their effect 
on optimal policies. In the first section, we calculate optimal policies, for the stylized 
empirical example above, under three alternative assumptions about randomness in 
weather and prices. The first assumption is the base case where both prices and 
weather conditions are assumed random. The second and third assumptions are, 
respectively, that either weather conditions or prices are deterministic. The differences 
in optimal policies arising from these alternative assumptions are discussed, and the 
implications of ignoring either price or weather uncertainty are highlighted. In the 
second section, the variance in net returns is decomposed into price and yield 
components, using an asymptotic approximation. This decomposition makes explicit 
the contribution of each of the two sources of uncertainty
C hang es in  O p tim a l P o lice s from  A lte rn a tive  Sources of R is k
The stylized empirical model presented above is solved two additional times, 
once with prices fixed at their mean levels over the 30 years but allowing weather 
conditions to vary according to the historical observations, and once with prices 
varying according to the historical observations over the 30 years but with weather 
conditions fixed at their 30 year mean. The optimal policies for symmetric and 
asymmetric information under these assumptions are reported in Tables D -l and D-2.
If weather conditions are assumed fixed rather than random, the production 
process is deterministic; the amount of corn silage produced from a given level of 
nitrogen is known with certainty. Net returns are still random because of price 
uncertainty, but the marginal effects of nitrogen on yield risk, which is crucial in 
determining relative payments for the two groups, is ignored. In particular, note that 
the optimal payments to group 1 under symmetric information (Table D -l) will, like the 
payments to group 2, decrease with higher degrees of risk aversion. This directly
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T a b le  D - l .  O p tim a l G reen  Paym ents U nder Sym m etric In fo rm atio n .
Safety
Level
( n
Risk
Aversion
Parameter
(a)
Random Weather, 
Random Prices
Fixed Weather, 
Random Prices
Random Weather, 
Fixed Prices
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
40 0.00 4.34 4.11 4.37 4.15 4.37 4.15
40 0.01 5.45 3.01 3.65 3.45 7.00 3.53
40 0.03 5.88 1.63 2.99 2.72 9.50 2.45
30 0.00 9.82 10.36 9.87 10.43 9.87 10.43
30 0.01 11.28 8.40 8.55 9.10 13.69 9.51
30 0.03 11.84 5.67 7.22 7.58 17.11 7.78
20 0.00 23.57 25.39 23.66 25.50 23.66 25.50
20 0.01 25.39 21.88 21.17 22.94 29.18 24.21
20 0.03 26.27 16.62 18.33 19.77 33.88 21.71
contradicts the result above: under symmetric information, the payments to group 1 
should increase with the degree of risk aversion because nitrogen fertilizer reduces yield 
risk.18 In the case where information is asymmetric (Table D-2), ignoring weather 
variability causes the difference in payments, Sj -  S2, to increase with the risk aversion 
level, again contradicting the earlier result. In sum, ignoring the variability in weather 
conditions ignores out important information in determining optimal "green" 
payments and could have important implications for the size of any windfall gains to 
either group or to overall program costs.
Consider now the case where weather conditions vary over the 30 years, but 
prices are held fixed at their mean levels. Because yield is assumed random, the 
important marginal risk effects of nitrogen are still considered. Thus, the qualitative
18This is because nitrogen must necessarily be reduced to satisfy environmental quality 
standards, and lower levels of N imply an increase variability of yield. Risk averters therefore 
require larger compensation to accept this added risk.
T a b le  D -2 . O p tim a l G reen  Paym ents U nder A sym m etric In fo rm atio n .
Risk
Safety Aversion Random Weather, Fixed Weather, Random Weather,
Level Parameter Random Prices Random Prices Fixed Prices___
(L*) («) Group 1 Group 2 Difference Group 1 Group 2 Difference Group 1 Group 2 Difference
40 0.00 8.44 4.11 4.33 8.52 4.15 4.37 8.52 4.15 4.37
40 0.01 8.33 3.01 5.32 7.09 3.45 3.64 10.16 3.53 6.63
40 0.03 7.29 1.63 5.66 5.69 2.72 2.97 10.86 2.45 8.41
30 0.00 18.27 10.36 7.91 18.37 10.43 7.94 18.37 10.43 7.94
30 0.01 16.94 8.40 8.54 16.12 9.10 7.02 19.43 9.51 9.92
30 0.03 14.45 5.67 8.78 13.61 7.58 6.03 19.23 7.78 11.45
20 0.00 37.32 25.39 11.93 37.44 25.50 11.94 37.32 25.50 11.82
20 0.01 34.09 21.88 12.21 33.91 22.94 10.97 37.53 24.21 13.32
20 0.03 29.11 16.62 12.49 29.44 19.77 9.67 36.09 21.71 14.38
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results are consistent with the original payments where all factors are random (Tables 
D -l and D-2). The influence of price variability appears to be in the magnitude of the 
estimated payments to farmers; "green" payments for fixed prices are larger than when 
prices are random, particularly for group 1. This suggests that price variability lessens 
the change in variability of net returns in response to changes in nitrogen fertilizer. 
When prices are assumed fixed, the more dramatic changes in yield variability generate 
a need for larger compensation payments, especially for risk averse producers in group 
1. This phenomenon is explained in greater detail in the next section, where the 
variance in net returns is decomposed into price and yield components at various 
nitrogen rates. Variability in prices has an important influence on the optimal 
payments for both groups, and significantly alters results if ignored.
D eco m p o sitio n  of N et R etu rn  V a ria n ce
This section describes the decomposition of net return variance into price and yield 
components. The variance of net returns is
(13) var(R;) = var(p y ')-2N ; cov(py',r) + N 2 var(r),
which consists of three terms: the variance of revenue, the covariance of revenue and 
cost, and the variance of cost. Using the Kendall-Stuart asymptotic approximation, the 
variance of revenue can be written:
(14) var(py') = E2 (y') var(p) + 2E(y ‘ )E(p) cov(y1 ,p) + E2(p) var(y') + 8 var,
where the term Svar involves higher order terms (Burt and Finley, 1968). The covariance 
of revenue and cost can be written:
(15) - 2N i cov(yy',r) = -2N ,[E(p)cov(y',r) + E(y')cov(p,r) + 8cov],
where 8COv involves higher order terms (Bohrnstedt and Goldberger, 1969). If the 
remainder terms 8var and 8COv are small, equations (14) and (15) will provide a useful 
decomposition of the yield and price effects on the first two terms in (13).
T a b le  D -3 . D eco m po sitio n of V a ria n ce  in  N et R eturns.3
Nitrogen
Level Description
Variance of Revenues 
Price-
Price Yield Yield 
Variance Covar. Variance
Covar. 
Between 
Revenue 
and Cost
Variance 
of Cost
Approx.
Net
Return
Variance
Actual
Net
Return
Variance
Relative
Error
Group 1:
133 N 3 0 for a =0.01 3406.77 993.26 6791.47 -55.53 100.98 11236.95 11735.73 -4.25%
0.303 0.088 0.604 -0.005 0.009
99 N 1 * for L*=40 3139.59 987.47 7462.94 -20.79 55.73 11624.94 12173.44 -4.51%
0.270 0.085 0.642 -0.002 0.005
84 N t * for L* =30 2967.90 974.54 7767.02 -7.91 40.12 11741.66 12306.66 -4.59%
0.253 0.083 0.661 -0.001 0.003
63 N j * for L*=20 2679.06 945.13 8203.14 5.92 22.57 11855.81 12435.52 -4.66%
0.226 0.080 0.692 0.000 0.002
Group 2:
156 N 2° for a =0.01 2489.31 101.72 474.48 -368.87 138.99 2835.62 2832.32 0.12%
0.878 0.036 0.167 -0.130 0.049
128 N 2 * forL*= 40 2292.65 121.62 366.31 -279.62 93.15 2594.12 2610.70 -0.64%
0.884 0.047 0.141 -0.108 0.036
109 N 2 * for L*=30 2117.29 132.34 306.21 -222.64 67.55 2400.74 2429.84 -1.20%
0.882 0.055 0.128 -0.093 0.028
80 N 2 * for L*=20 1794.33 143.55 233.64 . -143.00 36.39 2064.91 2111.27 -2.20%
0.869 0.070 0.113 -0.069 0.018
" Numbers beneath the variances are the proportion of (approximated) net return variance attributable to the factor in question.
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The results of this decomposition, at the net returns for selected nitrogen 
fertilization rates, are in Table D-3. The third, fourth, and fifth columns in the table 
correspond to the terms in equation (14); they decompose the variance of revenue into 
price variance, price-yield covariance, and yield variance effects. The sixth and seventh 
columns in Table D-3 correspond to the covariance between revenue and cost (equation 
15), and the variance in cost (the third term in equation 13), respectively. Before 
interpreting the components, we first note that the decomposition was relatively 
accurate; the relative errors were 4.5% and 0.4% for groups 1 and 2, respectively.
For both groups, the variance of revenue is overwhelmingly the most important 
of the three effects on the variance of net returns, generally representing over 90% of the 
approximated net return variance. In determining the variance of revenues, both yield 
and price variability are significant determinants for both groups. For group 1, yield 
variance increases as nitrogen fertilizer is reduced, owing to the risk-reducing effect of 
nitrogen. Furthermore, the proportion of net return variance attributable to yield 
increases as fertilizer is reduced. This implies that if price variability is ignored, relative 
changes in net return variability due to changes in nitrogen would be overstated. For 
group 2, price variability is the single most important component of net return variance, 
more than five times as large as the variability due to yield. Because nitrogen is a risk- 
increasing input for group 2, yield variance declines as fertilization rates are reduced.
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